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Mixed Ownership Reform and
Corporate Governance in China's
State-Owned Enterprises
Jiangyu Wang & Tan Cheng-Han*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides an early assessment of the impact on

corporategovernance of the most recent wave of reform of China's
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) announced by the CCP in 2013,

officially known as the mixed-ownership reform (MOR). It offers
a comprehensive and detailed account of the background, policy
and regulatory frameworks, and rationaleof the MOR in light of
the history of ownership reform in China. It also conducts
empirical studies of the change in ownership and board

composition in over 30 SOEs which have recently completed their
MOR experiments, as well as several case studies. It observes that
MOR's impact on SOE corporategovernance has been embodied
in the "retreat of the state," the "advance of the Chinese
Communist Party" (the Party), and a limited yet emerging
separationof power between the Party and the board in SOEs. To

explain this observation, the Article argues that the MOR
programme is driven by three current beliefs of the Chinese Partystate on the future of SOEs in China. First, ownership and

ownership reform matter. Second, sharing control, rather than
dominance by a single state shareholder, improves both the
efficiency and governanceof SOEs. Third, the MOR was designed

to develop partnerships or alliances between the state
shareholdersand strategic investors in order to help the post-
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and Comparative Law at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong. Tan ChengHan is Dean & Chair Professor of Commercial Law at the School of Law, City University
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MOR state enterprises improve their efficiency and enhance
market opportunities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Ownership reform has been at the center of the economic reform

programme of the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) since the
early 1990s,1 when the Chinese government decided to corporatise its
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is understandable given the
collectivization of property that was established after 1949, when the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or "the Party")

defeated the

Kuomintang government. The PRC's first Company Law was adopted

in 1993 to facilitate the fulfillment of this objective by establishing a
to convert traditional SOEs into "modern
legal framework
2
enterprises." These enterprises are corporate entities with systems of
modern ownership and governance structures in which the decisionmaking powers are jointly exercised by the shareholders' meeting, the
3
board of directors, the supervisory board, and the manager, very much
akin to how modern corporations are governed in other jurisdictions.
In China's historical transition from a Soviet-style planned
economy to a market-oriented economy, ownership reform serves two
functions. First, the policy to initiate ownership reform in China
represented a fundamental breakthrough in China's socialist ideology.
The planned "command economy," which China established and
practiced between 1949 and 1979, was underlined by the Marxist
economic ideology that the state "owns the means of production, and
therefore controls the economy, and determines what to produce and
who will receive what products at what levels according to the state
plan." 4 Any attempt to break the state's monopoly in the economy
would be considered a serious political challenge to the socialist Partystate itself. In this respect, the CCP's decision to launch ownership

reform to transform the Chinese economy from complete public
ownership to a mixed structure demonstrated a strong political will to
depart from orthodox Marxist ideology. More significantly, it has
offered legitimacy to all future mixed-ownership reform initiatives that

1.

See Sujian Guo, The Ownership Reform in China: What Direction and How

Far?, 12(36) J. CONTEMP. CHINA 553, 553 (2003) (noting that "the ownership system,
rather than market mechanism, is fundamental to China's economic transition").
JIANGYU WANG, COMPANY LAW IN CHINA: REGULATION OF BUSINESS
2.
ORGANIZATIONS IN A SOCIALIST MARKET EcONOMY 33 (Edward Elgar ed., 2014); see also
OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECoNOMY 433 (2002).
Id. at 151-95.
3.
Guo, supra note 1, at 554-55.
4.
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would not necessarily be considered ideological violations of China's
socialism. The upper limit for such ownership transformation is

officially described in the CCP's first decision in 1992 to establish a
"socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics" under which
the Chinese economy must be one that the public sector dominates, and
various types of ownership systems coexist. 5
Second, ownership reform also generated institutional reform in
China, which created a common legal framework for both state and
nonstate-business organizations, paving the way for corporatization
and eventual privatization of SOEs.s The adoption of the Company
Law in 1993, as mentioned, is a milestone in such institutional

evolution.? The law provides a national basis for the establishment,
organization, and operation of "limited liability companies" and "joint
stock limited companies," which are separate and self-responsible legal
entities able to operate independently under the law. 8
The real effect of corporatization resulting from ownership reform
on SOE governance has, however, been questioned. Two arguments
have been advanced. In the first, Milhaupt and Zheng have called for
the need to look beyond ownership when studying Chinese-state
capitalism. They call for attention to be paid to the institutional
environment in China, which in practice makes the distinction

between state ownership and private ownership less meaningful. In
their own words, functionally, "SOEs and large POEs [privately owned
enterprises] share many similarities in the areas commonly thought to
distinguish state-owned firms from privately owned firms: market

5.
[a1}'
T
2
riT1-i~i:nH i f*TtZ iT[5li Mi` Ki [Decision of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several Issues concerning the
Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy System],
PEOPLE'S DAILY,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/5179/20010430/456592.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.c/2TEX-FQNZ] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
6.
Though it has famously been argued that China's SOE reform is
"corporatization, not privatization", Donald C. Clarke, Corporatisation, not
Privatisation, 7 CHINA ECON. Q. 27, 27-30 (2003).
7.
The P.R.C. Company Law, or Gongsifa, was adopted by the National People's
Congress Standing Committee December 1993 and amended respectively in December
1999, August 2004, October 2005, December 2003 and October 2018. P.R.C. Company
Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, rev. Dec.
25, 1999, Aug. 28, 2004, Oct. 27, 2005, Dec. 28, 2013, and Oct. 26, 2018, effective Nov. 5,
2018),
http://www.npc.govcn/npc/c12435/201811/68a85058b4c843d1a938420a77da14b4.shtml
[https:/Iperma.ce/43S3-A8WG] (archived Feb. 15, 2020) (China) [hereinafter P.R.C.
Company Law].
8.
BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 301
(2007) [hereinafter NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY].
9.
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism
and Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 669 (2015).
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access, receipt of state subsidies, proximity to state power, and

execution of the government's policy objectives."'

0

In a related argument, Wang has identified the "twin governance
structures" in China's SOEs: one for legal governance and the other for
political governance." The legal governance structure, featuring the
shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the supervisory board,
and the management team, is installed according to the PRC Company
Law and represents the convergence of Chinese corporate governance
with Western corporate law norms. On the other hand, political
governance is "a CCP-dominated process that actually controls
2
personnel appointments and decision-making in SOEs."' In such a
case, as long as the board of directors is not given real power to run the
company independently and the CCP organization is really in charge,
the percentage of private ownership is more or less irrelevant in SOEs
with mixed ownership.
Although both of the aforesaid arguments are powerful in their
own ways, it would not be fair enough to reckon that ownership is
totally irrelevant in the study of corporate governance in Chinese
SOEs," in part because of the two general functions of ownership
reform that were discussed at the beginning of this Article. More
specifically, ownership cannot be ignored because corporate decisionmaking eventually has to go through the legal governance structure,
and hence has to follow the rules concerning decision-making in the
PRC Company Law, as a matter of both principle and formality.
Ownership in a Chinese company, be it state owned or privately owned,
necessarily places power with shareholders to vote on all corporate
matters that fall within the province of the shareholders' meeting,
including the right through the voting process to select the directors
and supervisors.' 4 This is true even in any corporatized SOE with a
Party cell.' 5 That is, to the extent the Chinese Party-state wants to
control SOEs, it understands that any move to increase private

10. Id. at 668.
Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of CorporateGovernance in Chinas State11.
owned Enterprises, 47 CoRNEI, INT'L L.J. 631, 648-60 (2014).
Id. at 648.
12.
13. See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 9, at 669 (emphasizing that they "do not
argue that corporate ownership is completely irrelevant in China or that Chinese POEs
are identical in all respects to SOEs.").
P.R.C. Company Law, supranote 7, at arts. 37, 97 (Article 37 notes the powers
14.
of shareholders in limited liability companies, which are functional equivalents of closed
held corporations, and Article 97 notes granting shareholders in joint stock companies,
which are the functional equivalent of public corporations, the same powers by making
reference to Art. 37).
15. See id. at art. 19 (SOEs which are incorporated in the form of limited liability
companies and joint stock companies must comply with the PRC Company Law, though
Art. 19 of the Company Law requires companies with CCP committees must provide
necessary conditions for the activities of the Party committees.).
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ownership in SOEs will lead to the possibility that the private investor
will demand more participation in corporate decision-making, which
must be treated at least as a legal matter. 16 In a nutshell, though
ownership may be subject to important constraints in China, and there
is indeed a need to look beyond ownership to consider Chinese state
capitalism as a whole, it is still important to pay due consideration to
ownership change in an SOE and analyze how such a change may
impact corporate governance in SOEs.
It is in such a context that we aim to provide an early assessment
of the impact on corporate governance of the most recent wave of SOE
reform announced by the CCP in 2013,17 officially known as the mixedownership reform (MOR). The stated purpose of the MOR is to bring
private-sector investment and management into SOEs to improve the
efficiency and governance of the state sector.1 8 Since 2016, China has
launched four rounds of MOR reforms. 19 The first three pilot reforms
included fifty SOEs, covering seven key sectors including electricity,
oil,
natural
gas,
rail
transportation,
civil
aviation,
and
telecommunications. 2 0 The Chinese government nominated 160 SOEs
for the fourth round of the MOR programme in May 2019, possibly in
acknowledgment of the perceived success of the previous MOR
reforms.2 1 An official source suggests that by 2018, a total of 2,880
SOEs conducted MOR, which included 70 percent of the central
SOEs.22 Xiao Yaqing, Chairman of the state-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC),

16.

See WANG, supra note 2.
17.
See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
18.
See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
19.
Zhong Nan, 100 SOEs to Join 4th Round of Mixed Ownership Reform, CHINA
DAILY
(Apr.
17,
2019),
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/17/WS5cb67648a3104842260b697c.html
[https://perma.cc/GT8U-6SWF] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
20.
1&`X [Xu Shanchang], /i i
iMi-PY-tjRd
[Policy and
Practice of the Mixed Ownership Reform in China's SOEs],
1fL|
- [CHINA REFORM]
(Oct.

27,

2018),

http://www.chinareform.org.cn/forum/crf/84/speech/201.810/t20181027_275799.htm
[https://perma.cc/3GTM-6NCQ] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
21.
China Approves 160 SOEs in Pilot Mixed-Ownership Reform, XINHUA NEWS
(May
17,
2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/17/c_138067229.htm
[https://perma.cc/NM9R-GNA5] (archived Feb. 15, 2020) [hereinafter China Approves
160 SOEs].
22.
China Accelerates Mixed Ownership Reform of SOEs: Newspaper, XINHUA
NEWS (May 13, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/13/c_138055082.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5DSF-YAWB] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
According to SASAC, this number included the second and third level subsidiaries of
central SOEs and local SOEs. See Q
/i/rye
//1ik
?PfkI//I/ [Mixed Ownership
Reform
Accelerated
in
SOEs],
XINHUA
NEWS
(Nov.
14,
2018),
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-11/14/content_5340406.htm
[https://perma.cc/NV53PE3V] (archived Feb. 15, 2020).
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expressed the hope that MOR would lead to breakthroughs in China's
SOE reform but still warned that the MOR programme was not about
privatization of China's massive public sector.2 3

The rest of the discussion proceeds as follows. Part II offers a
detailed and comprehensive account of the background, proposed
measures, and policy features of the MOR programme in light of the
history of China's SOE reform. It also discusses two recent
institutional changes in China's SOE policy that have accompanied the
programme, namely the classification of SOEs into commercial entities
and public services entities and the shift from asset management to
capital management by inserting a layer between the government and
the firms commercial SOEs.
Part III looks at MOR in practice. It begins with a survey of the
trending change in shareholder ownership, board composition,
24
which is followed by
important board positions, and board powers
several MOR case studies. Part III then discusses the changes brought
to corporate governance of SOEs by the policy and regulatory
initiatives on SOE reform as well as the emerging practices in
implementing the MOR programme. It observes several trends in the
corporate-governance framework of MOR firms. First, there is an
obvious retreat of the Chinese state from SOE governance with the
implementation of the shift from "asset management" to "capital
management." On the other hand, the retreat of the state is
accompanied by the strengthened involvement of the CCP in SOEs, as
the firms have been asked to institutionalize the role of the Party in
their articles of association. It is observed that there is a limited degree
of separation of power between the Party committee and the board of
directors. Based on this, that MOR has set out a new model of corporate
governance in some of China's SOEs, which is styled here as a
partnership-based, consultative-governance model. That is, on the
condition that SOE ownership is diversified to include substantial
nonstate ownership (with the state remaining a significant but not
necessarily majority shareholder), decision-making power is shared

7'fY @iJ It/h i Y '77"-See ' EUJl_ [Xiao Yaqing], /kn '
Ownership Reform is Not About Privatization, and It Is Unlikely that It Can
Resolve
and Close All
the Problems],
XINHUA
NEWS
(Mar. 9,
2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/20191h/2019-03/09/c-1210077198.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q54U-3MDN] (archived Feb. 15, 2020) (press conference of SASAC at
annual meeting of the National People's Congress); see also Qu Hui & Han Wei, More
State Enterprises Set for Mixed Ownership Reforms, CAIXIN GLOB. (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-03-29/more-state-enterprises-setfor-mixed
ownership-reforms- 01 398493.html [https://perma.cc/TF4J -8ZRB] (archived Feb. 15,
2020).
For example, whether the board of directors would be allowed to appoint
24.
senior executives.
23.

' [Mixed
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between the Party organization and the board of directors (in which
nonstate shareholders appoint the majority of the directors).
Part IV attempts to understand the rationale of MOR from both
theoretical and practical perspectives and, on this basis, explain the
internal factors that motivate the Chinese Party-state to pursue MOR.
It argues that the MOR programme is driven by three current beliefs
on the future of SOEs in China. First, it is clear that ownership reform
evidence
about
China's economic reform
matters.
Empirical
consistently suggests partially privatized SOEs, or SOEs with mixed
ownership, exhibit higher productivity, better performance, and
improved corporate governance than firms with complete or dominant
state ownership. 25 This is consistent with the strong economic
literature worldwide that privatisation leads to efficiency gains.2 6 To
the extent there are both ideological and rational constraints for China
not to pursue full privatization of its state-backed economic entities, at
least at this stage, "[p]erhaps the 'mixed economy' is a decent model of
industrial organization after all [in China].1"27 The second belief is that
sharing control, rather than dominance by a single state shareholder,
improves both the efficiency and governance of SOEs. Third, the MOR
was designed to develop partnerships or alliances between the state
shareholders and strategic investors in order to help the post-MOR
state enterprises improve their efficiency and enhance market
opportunities.
Part V concludes with several general remarks. It restates the
central argument of this Article that MOR offers a practical approach
at this stage of China's development which defines the role and
operation of SOEs in the context of a socialist market economy in a
single-party state. China should be encouraged to reduce state

ownership

in its

SOEs through

mixed ownership

reform. The

introduction of nonstate capital into SOEs has led to greater
participation in corporate governance by nonstate investors, which is
required by China's corporate law but also evidenced in practice by the
empirical study of this Article. This development may be interpreted
as that the Chinese Party-state has realized the benefit of "sharing
control" in corporate governance. Nevertheless, the institutionalization

25.
See infra, footnotes 214-21 and the accompanying texts. See also the
literature in, infra, note 225.
26.
See William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market:A Survey
of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39(2) J. EcON. LITERATURE 321, 381 (2001)
("privatization 'works,' in the sense that divested firms almost always become more
efficient, more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, and become
financially healthier"); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM
PLAN TO MARKET 143 (1996) (noting the positive effects of privitisation in transition
economies, including China).
27.
Barry Naughton, China'sDistinctive System: Can It be a Model for Others?,
19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 65, 437, 442 (2010).
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of the role of the Party in SOE corporate governance demonstrates the

limit of such control sharing.

II. THE TOP-LEVEL DESIGN FOR MIXED-OWNERSHIP REFORM: POLICY,
MEASURES, AND FEATURES

A. Historical Development and Recent InstitutionalReform in China's
State Sector
SOE reform in China has been a journey toward improving firm
efficiency through interconnected ownership change and good

corporate governance, but not rapid privatization.

28

The reform of

China's state economy has lasted for four decades since the late 1970s.

The SOE system, established and developed during the planned
economy period (1950s to 1970s), featured state enterprises being
administratively controlled and directly managed by the government
at various levels.2 9 In that system, a state enterprise, whatever it was
called, was a work unit or danwei, which was part of the government
30
From the beginning, SOE reform
with multiple roles and functions.
has been oriented to address the soft budget constraint problems,
increase enterprise autonomy, and improve corporate governance, with
31
the view to transforming SOEs into commercially viable entities. In
this process, four modalities were used, at different stages of the

reform,

to

achieve

the

corporatization, ownership
enterprise groups.

aforesaid
diversification,

objectives:
and

contracting,

creation

of large

The first stage of the SOE reform (1978-1992) introduced the
contractual managerial responsibility system for the purpose of
enhancing enterprise autonomy and granting market-based incentives
32
to the state-appointed managers of the SOEs. Under the contractual
system, an SOE was allowed to ride on a unique system of dual-track
pricing3 3 and, on this basis, sign an agreement with the government

Donald C. Clarke, Law without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance
28.
Institutions, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 131, 142-44 (2010).
OECD, REFORMING CHINA'S ENTERPRISES 51 (2002); see BARRY NAUGHTON,
29.
GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE EcoNOMIC REFORM 1978-1993, at 97-136 (1995);
WUJINGLIAN, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 139-42

(2005).
See STOYAN TENEV ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE
30.
REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 10-11 (2002); see
also JINGLIAN, supra note 29, at 140.
See NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 301 (2007);
31.
JINGLIAN, supra note 29; TENEV ET AL., supra note 30, at 9-20.
See TENEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 13-14.
32.

33. China adopted a dual-track approach to price liberalization in its transition
from a planned to a market economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The government
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agency in charge, through which the SOE ensured the government a
fixed amount of profit, while retaining any surplus profit. 34 Ownership

reform emerged in the second stage (1992-2003), known as gaizhi
(ownership transformation). 35 Ownership diversification was the
major theme in this period, leading to corporatization and a limited
degree of privatization. 3 6 The promulgation of the PRC Company Law
aimed to create an institutional framework for the modern enterprise
system and paved the way for reorganizing the SOEs into Westernstyle corporations.3 7 After the CCP adopted the policy of "grasping the
large, letting go the small" (zhuada fangxiao) in 1995,38 the Chinese
government retained about five hundred to one thousand large
enterprises and restructured other SOEs through sale or lease.3 9 The
third stage (2003-2013) carried on the corporatization programme and
further institutionalized state-SOE relations with the creation of
SASAC in 2003.40 SASAC's emergence indicated for the first time that
the Chinese state would behave as a shareholder in SOEs. 4 ' The
continuing reform of SOEs under SASAC also resulted in the creation
of large enterprise groups brought about through consolidation and

restructuring of SOEs, leading to a significant reduction of the total
number and a substantial increase in the average size of SOEs.4 2
Meanwhile, the Chinese government placed emphasis on dominance of
state ownership in strategic industries including, initially, high

maintained price controls and quotas to some extent under the planned track, through
which "economic agents were assigned rights to and obligations for fixed quantities of
goods at fixed planned prices and quotas ." A market track was established
simultaneously to allow economic agents to transact at "free market prices." Gradually,
the price controls under the planned track was phased out. See Yingyi Qian, The
Institutional Foundation of China's Market Transition, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK
CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT EcoNoMICS 1999, 384 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E.
Stiglitz eds., 2000).
34. JINGLIAN, supra note 29, at 146; see also Ligang Song, State-Owned
Enterprise Reform in China: Past, Present and Prospects, in CHINA'S 40 YEARS OF
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 1978-2018, 349-50 (Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song & Cai Fang
eds., 2018).
35.
Song, supra note 34. at 351. See generally Ross GARNAUT ET AL., CHINA'S
OWNERSHIP TRANSFORMATION: PROCESS, OUTCOMES, PROSPECTS (2005).
36.
See SHAHID YUSUF ET AL., UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA'S
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 105-14 (2006).
37.
See TENEV ET AL., supra note 30, at 16-17.

38.
This policy was formally approved as a state policy by the National People's
Congress in 1997.
39.
Song, supranote 34, at 352.
40.
NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 302-03.
41.
Jiangyu Wang, The PoliticalLogic of Corporate Governance in China's StateOwned Enterprises, 47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 648-60 (2014) (noting that SASAC was
created "as a centralized representative of state investor" and, before SASAC's
establishment, "the ownership of SOEs within the government was very fragmented, and
many bureaucracies, from central ministries to departments of local governments, had
control over SOEs").
42.
Song, supra note 34, at 357-58.
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technology, nonrenewable natural resources, public utilities and
43
infrastructure services, and national security.
Since 2013, SOE reform has entered its fourth stage, marked by a
call for further action by a decision of the Third Plenum of the CCP in
2013.44 One of the breakthroughs of the decision was its emphasis on
the critical role of the private sector in the Chinese economy in that
"both public and non-public sectors are key components of the socialist
market economy. '5 As Zheng has put it, this may represent "a major
shift in official ideology away from the superior status of the state
sector" 46 and that "the Chinese government no longer insists on
7
majority ownership, except for strategic industries."4 In other words,
as long as state assets in the SOEs continue to grow, "it is no longer
imperative to maintain majority state ownership. "48
The new wave of reform was put into operational policy design
with the promulgation of a set of guidelines adopted by the CCP in
August 2015,49 which was followed by more detailed implementing
measures issued by China's State Council, together with a series of
supplementary policies and measures promulgated by the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), SASAC, and other
50
The guidelines have formed the new
relevant government agencies.
institutional background for the MOR programme. The following three
new policy initiatives in the guidelines are particularly worth noting.

Id. at 356.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China [CCCPC], $A-1-1 il/iiTl
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist
MXi<]M I'
S '-a
[tl(
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the
Major
on
Some
Party of China
(last visited
Reform] Part I, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm
Mar. 19, 2020) [https://porma.cc/7YUP-K8TI)] (archived Feb. 17, 2020), translation
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2O14-01/17/content_31226494 2.htm
in
available
[https://perma.cc/S9KG-LZSG] (archived Feb. 17, 2020) [hereinafter CCCPC Reform
Decision] (adopted at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress).
45.
Id.
Zheng Yu, China's State-Owned Enterprise Mixed Ownership Reform, 6 E.
46.
ASIAN POL'Y 4, 39, 41 (2014).
47.
Id.
48. Id.
[Guidelines of the
Ff3 W
W
i
( 1LWEN
-3a0c
I
CCCPC, X4
49.
CCP Central Committee and the PRC State Council to Deepen Reform of the Statehttp://www.gov.cn/zhengce/20152015),
24,
(Aug.
Enterprises]
owned
09/13/content_2930440.htm [https://perma.ce/M8R5-YKM7] (archived Feb. 17, 2020)
[hereinafter CCCPC Reform Guidelines].
' n >cF hI
State Council of the People's Republic of China [State Council], [
50.
43.
44.

7T lf=:1RM a:E [Opinions of the State Council on the Development of
/
(t
Mixed-ownership
Reform
in
SOEs]
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-09/24/content_10177.htm
[https://perma.cc/7Q6Q-UF33] (archived Feb. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Opinions of the
State Council].
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First, Chinese SOEs, according to their nature, are to be classified
into commercial SOEs (shangyelei) and public service SOEs
(gongyilei). 5 Table 1 displays the different types of SOEs, their
assigned objectives, and the respective measures proposed to reform

them. Commercial SOEs would operate fully on a commercial basis
with the for-profit purpose of enhancing efficiency and maximizing the
valuation of state assets. 52 Such firms are all required to be
restructured into modern stock corporations with a view to being listed
on a stock market in the future.5 3 The state can be the dominant
controller, a majority shareholder, or even a minority shareholder in

these firms. 54 On the other hand, the public service SOEs are expected
to provide public goods and services in a price-regulated environment
in order to enhance the Chinese people's standard of living. 55 Such
firms can be solely owned by the state, and they will be evaluated by
cost control, product quality, operational efficiency, and capacity in
delivering the requisite product or service.5 6

Table 1: Classification and Functional Definitions of Chinese SOEs
Category

Sub-

Defined by

Enterprise

Category

Sectors and

Objectives

Reform Measures

Areas
Commercial

Tier

1

SOEs

Fully

Maximizing the value

Taking the form of

competitive

of state capital

joint stock companies

sectors and

Operating on

Ownership

areas

commercial basis

diversification

Enterprise autonomy

Private investors can
be a majority
shareholder

Complete listing
Tier 2

National

Safeguarding national

security

security

maintain a

Ensuring the smooth

controlling position in

industries or

operation of the

ownership

key point areas

Chinese economy

Private investors can

in the

Developing forward-

be minority

commanding

looking, strategic

shareholders

heights of

industries

important

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See
See
Id.
See
See
See

CCCPC Reform Guidelines, supra note 49, at Part
id. at Part II (5).

The state must

11.

id. at Part II (4)-(5).
id. at Part II (6).
id.; see also NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note

8.
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national

Harmonizing

State-enterprise

economy

economic, social, and

separation in natural

Natural

security interests

monopolies

monopoly
sectors

Undertaking
state-assigned
significant
projects

Public

Public goods

Safeguarding people's

Taking the form of

Interest
SOPs

and services

livelihood

wholly state owned

Serving the society

companies or more

Prices of products or

diversified ownership

services can be

if conditions are met

adjusted by the

Private enterprises

government

can be involved in the

Market mechanisms

form of outsourcing,

encouraged to improve

franchise, or agency

efficiency

by agreement

Second, the role of the state owner in enterprises, exercised by
SASAC at the central and local levels, will shift from "asset
57
Specifically, state capital
management" to "capital management."
investment/management companies will be established to serve as the

state shareholder in SOEs. 5 8 SASAC, in turn, will become the state
shareholder in such capital investment/management companies. The
rationale for creating such state capital companies is to establish a
firewall between SASAC and the SOEs so as to stop the "tendency for
SASAC to become increasingly involved in the business operation of

See Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Part IV(9); see also

L

$

57.

[Programme on Reforming the State Capital Authorization
U)i°
Jai
System], STATE COUNCIl, (Apr. 14, 2019), http:/www.gov.cn/zhengce/content2O19041/28/content_n87 11 2.htm [https://perma.ce/TCX9-TVP4} (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
Numerous state capital entities have been established in recent years. China
58.
National Cereal, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) and Chinese Investment
state
designated as
the first pilot companies
Corporation (CIC) were
investment/management entities. The State Development & Investment Corp Ltd is the
largest state-owned investment holding company for restructuring the state sector, but
many capital investment and management companies have been established on a
sectoral basis.
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SOEs." 5 9 Arguably, this policy move brings China's SOE supervision
model closer to Singapore's Temasek model. 60
Third, the formation of the "modern enterprise system" is included
as a key part of the reform, with the stated aim of establishing a

modern corporation, preferably listed, with diversified shareholding
and sound corporate governance. 61 The policy statement on SOE
corporate governance embodies a wide range of objectives, which is
discussed in Part II.C. Suffice it to say that the corporate governance
system proposed for SOEs in the guidelines looks positive from the

perspective of the convergence side of the global corporate governance
debate, as it seems to allow board centrality and independence in
corporate decision-making. Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV.B,
these objectives have to be read in tandem with the prescribed role of

the CCP in SOEs.
B. The General Policy Design for Mixed-Ownership Reform
1. A Balanced Relationship between the State and the Market
The MOR is supposed to be a state-driven process. However, the
Chinese government seemingly still intends for the MOR to take place

in the marketplace in the process known as zhengfu yindao, shichang
yunzuo.6 2 This follows the spirit of the Third Plenum Decision that, for
the first time, advocated for "the market to play a decisive role in the

allocation of resources," and the state would refrain from exercising
excessive intervention." 63 The state promises to "respect" the
principles of the market economy and allow the enterprises to be the
central players in the MOR process. 64 In addition, a vow is made to
protect the property rights of all forms of ownership, enforce contracts,

59.

See

ENTERPRISE

CHUNLIN ZHANG, THE
REFORM
SINCE

WORLD BANK
THE

IN CHINA'S STATE-OWNED
1980S
7
(2019),

http://documents.worldbank.org/curateden/828251550586271970/pdf/1 34778-WorldBank-in-China-SOE-reform-final-Feb-09-2019-En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SH5F-CSC3
(archived Feb. 17, 2020).
60.
See Yu Hong, China's Push for State-owned Enterprise Reform, EAl
BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 1083 i (2015) (noting the "proposal to establish state capital
investment corporations is viewed as a Singapore-inspired quest, modelled on Temasek

Holdings"); Tan Cheng-Han et al., State-Owned Enterprises in Singapore: Historical
Insights Into a PotentialModel for Reform, 28 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 61, 88-90 (2015) (The
Temasek model is intended to create a level of separation between the Singapore
government and government linked companies so as to facilitate commercial decision
making that is insulated from the dictates of government policy.).
CCCPC Reform Guidelines, supra note 49, at Parts 111(7)-(8),
61
62.
Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Point 2.
63.
CCCPC Reform Decision, supra note 44, at Points 2-3; see also Sarah Y. Tong;
China'sNew Push to Reform the State Sector: Progressand Drawbacks, 16(3) CHINA INT'L
J., 35, 43 (2018).
64.
Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Part 1(2).
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and encourage fair competition

65

On the other hand, the CCP has also

stressed that the state sector should retain "dominance" (zhuti diwei)
and play the leading role (zhudao zuoyong) by enhancing the "state
sector vitality, controlling capacity and influence" in the Chinese
economy. 66 In this spirit, the general policy design of the MOR
programme suggests that the state sector can involve private
investment. The Third Plenum Decision confidently stated this

objective as follows:
A mixed economy with cross holding by and mutual fusion between state-owned
capital, collective capital and non-public capital is an important way to
materialize the basic economic system of China. It is conducive to improving the
amplification function of state-owned capital, ensuring the appreciation of its
value and raising its competitiveness, and it is conducive to enabling capital with
all kinds of ownership to draw on one another's strong points to offset
weaknesses, stimulate one another and develop together.

67

On this basis, the CCP declared that it "will allow more SOEs and
enterprises of other types of ownership to develop into mixed
enterprises" and "non-state-owned capital to hold shares in projects
invested by state-owned capital," as well as "mixed enterprises to

implement employee stock ownership plans
68
communities of capital owners and laborers."

(ESOP)

to

form

2. Modes of Participation in MOR Firms
MOR has been planned to be conducted at two levels: the corporate
69
group (parent/holding company) level and the subsidiary level. The
subsidiary SOEs are firms that engage in business, many of which are
listed companies themselves. At the current stage, MOR is prioritized
at the subsidiary level with the view of redefining the role of the state
shareholder, in this case the parent/holding company, to ensure it
functions as a shareholder in accordance with the PRC Company
Law. 7 0 MOR at the parent/holding company level is permitted but will
7
only be carried out on a larger scale at a later stage. ' The nonstate
capital entities allowed to acquire shares in SOEs include private
investors, collectively owned enterprises, 72 and foreign investors

CCCPC Reform Decision, supra note 44, at Point 5.
Id. at Point 2.
Id. at Point 6.
Id.
69. Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Points 6-7.
Id. at Point 6.
70.
Id. at Point 7.
71.
See WANG, supra note 2, at 68 (giving the definition and functions of
72.
collectively-owned enterprises).

65.

66.
67.
68.
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through a variety of means. 7 3 Table 2 exemplifies the general, toplevel-designed requirements for the degree of state ownership in

different MOR firms.
Table 2: MOR State Ownership Requirements in Different Categories

of SOEs
Category

Sub-

Sectors or Areas

Ownership Requirements

Tier I

Fully competitive sectors or areas

Complete listing

Tier 2

Important telecommunication

Full or majority state

infrastructure, pivotal

ownership

Category
Commercial
SOEs

Ownership diversification

transportation infrastructure,

Nonstate enterprises allowed

water resources, and hydropower

to participate through

projects that control important

franchising or government

rivers, and cross-basin diversion

procurement

projects
Exploitation and unitization of

Full or absolute majority

important water resources, forest

state ownership

resources, and strategic mineral

Minority nonstate ownership

resources

allowed

between

Main river channels, main

Distinguishing

pipeline network of petroleum

natural monopolies and

and natural gas. and main grid

competitive

Full

businesses

or absolute majority

state ownership for natural
monopolies
Competitive business areas
Nuclear power, important public

Full or absolute state

technology platform, basic data

ownership

acquisition, and utilization

Minority nonstate ownership

involving meteorological mapping

allowed

hydrology
State reserve of strategic

Full or absolute state

materials in grain, oil, and

ownership

natural gas
National defense industries which

Full or absolute state

are involved in research and

ownership

development of strategic weapons
and equipment, in strategic
national security, or in core state
secrets;

73.

CCCPC Reform Guidelines, supra note 49, at Points 16-18.
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Phased relaxation of market
access to nonstate enterprises

Public

Public utilities including water.

Diversified ownership

Service

electricity, gas, heating, public

permitted in firms which

SOEs

transportation, public

"meet conditions"

infrastructures

Participation of nonstate
investors through
government procurement
franchising or agency by
agreements

Specifically, MOR is achieved through any or a combination of the

following modes of private participation:
1) The introduction of strategic investors who have extensive
experience in reorganizing firms through investments in them,
and in addition to capital, may provide management experience,
industrial connections, market access, and experience with the

stock market.7 4
2) Investments made by venture capital funds or industrial funds,
many of which have been established by the Chinese government
Known as state-controlled "guidance
at central and local levels.
funds," they are designed to use government-allocated "seed
money" to attract and direct private capital to invest in strategic
sectors and areas.7 6 In MOR projects with fund participation, an
investment syndicate is organised in the form of a limited

-

r % i f'f I VJ diA 'h [Focus on Mixed-ownership
See a PJ [DELOITTE],
74.
Reform], 1 )j[1.i -L& dicti-f i #1 IT 114 [Deloitte SOF Transformation White Paper] 11
https://www2.deloitte.com/cnlzh/pages/operations/articles/soe-transformation(2015),
whitepaper-issue2.html# [https://perma.cc/5ZEB-S8QTJ (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
Emily Feng, China's State-owned Venture Capital Funds Baftle to Make an
75.
e8-af4Impact. FIN. TIMES (Dec. 24 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4fa2caaa-f9fO-1
2022a0b02a6c [https://perma.cc/X8PW-HRK2] (archived Mar. 19, 2020) (noting "China
has claimed that it has amassed RMB12.5tn ($1.8tn) of state money across thousands of
venture capital funds to achieve its goal of technological dominance by 2025.").
"Guidance funds" are defined as "policy funds which are established by the
76.
government but operate on market-based principles", with the main purpose of 'directing
ii
Pi
Ii4 4C
social capital to innovative investment." See 'I I k L dill 1 iy i
[MINIsTRY OF FIN. & MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, NAT'L DWv. & REFORM COMM'N],

J

a\II

Opinions on the Establishment and
Operation of Guiding Funds for Innovative Investmenti Point 1 (Oct. 18, 2008),
8
120 592 4 I 75.html
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/g/200812/200
[https://perma.cc/P63G-CSPT] (archived Feb. 17, 2020); see also Song, supra note 34, at
;

48.

;[Guiding
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partnership, in which the guidance fund, as a limited partner,77
contributes 10 to 20 percent of the total investment, and funds
based on private or foreign capital make up the rest. The
syndicate then invests, often through a special purpose vehicle

(SPV), in SOEs which undergo MOR.7 s`In this way, the limited
investment of state capital will have significant leveraging effect
to lure a large amount of private investment into MOR firms.
3) Employee shareholding schemes (ESC) are also utilized
whereby employees who have made substantial contributions to
the SOE's performance are allowed to acquire shares in the firm,7 9
for the purpose of creating "a community of common interest for

the owners of capital and labor." 80 Chinese authorities only
permit ESC in commercial

SOEs

in fully competitive areas. 81

Initial public offerings (IPOs) are an important mechanism that

SOEs are encouraged to use.8 2 A key advantage of going public is that
it provides not only a legal regime that offers better protection of the
SOE's property rights but also a more institutionalized framework to
organize the SOE's corporate governance into standardized,
transparent structures. 3 IPOs also offer an exit opportunity for
strategic shareholders, as well as long-term incentives for employee

shareholders.8

77.

4

China's partnership law does not allow SOEs to be general partners. See eft f

i
i
[Partnership Enterprise Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), art. 3, translation available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=le2875e63e5b3de3bdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/AG9L-EE7L] (archived Feb. 17, 2020) (China) [hereinafter Partnership
Enterprise Law].
78.
See TJ [DELOITTE], supra note 74, at 10.
Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Point 15.
79.
80.
CCCPC Reform Decision, supra note 44, at Point 6.
F V 1 tlV Ri __92 [Opinions on Practising
81.
J- FP4-X1i
,Orki-IIiJ I IK
Employee Shareholding Scheme in State-Controlled Mixed Ownership Reform
Enterprises on Pilot Basis], STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMM'N OF
THE
STATE
COUNCIL
Part
II
(1)
(Aug.
18,
2016),
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588030/n2588924/c4297190/content.htm
[https://perma.ccXEV3-E863] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
82.
Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Point 3.
See P.R.C. Company Law, supra note 7.
83.
84.
See Opinions of the State Council, supra note 50, at Point 8.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MIXEI-OWNERSHIP REFORM: SEVERAL
CASE STUDIES
This Part examines how MOR is conducted in reality through four

case studies:

China Unicom,

China Eastern Logistics,

Sinopec

Marketing, and Yunnan Baiyao. It looks at the process of MOR in these
cases, with a focus on the change in ownership, representation of state
and private capital, and occupancy of important board positions.
A. Change of Ownership and Board Composition in MOR Companies:
A General Survey

As previously noted, China has launched four rounds of mixed
ownership reform, involving in total 210 SOEs, most of which are
subsidiaries of centrally administered SOEs. 85 Official statistics
revealed that, in 2018, two-thirds of such subsidiaries were already
firms which had finished MOR. 86 In 2018, minority ownership equity
in central SOEs was $7.2 trillion RMB, amounting to 36 percent of the
7
total market capitalization of these SOEs.8 According to SASAC, an
overwhelming majority of the minority shareholders' equity interests
8
were generated through MOR. 8
In a typical MOR case at the subsidiary level, an SOE, often the
holding company of a group, selects a subsidiary that owns an
important unit of the group's business and sells a stake in that
subsidiary to private/social investors, who may be allowed to possess
89
about 30 percent to 45 percent of the subsidiary. Such MOR can be

realised in the following manner: restructuring; IPO; Employee Stock
funds;
Ownership Plan (ESOP); introduction of investment
introduction of strategic investors; or a combination of some of these.

85. The first three rounds involved fifty SOEs and the fourth round 160 SOEs.
See Nan, supra note 19; f7r [Shanzhang], supra note 20; China Approves 160 SOEs
in Pilot Mixed-Ownership Reform, supra note 21.
`fi[State Council
-i i'4
iYA
g/V#/'Jil qil
'/k#z/I2018
86.
See
Information Office held Press Conference on the Economic Performance of Central SOEs
in the First Three Quarters of 2018], XINHUA NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/talking/20181015z/index.htm

[https://perma.cc/GPW7-

CEDD] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
'a/
f- p kf: /i [Review of the Mixed-ownership Reform of
See
87.
[PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS]
1 1. L5
Central SOEs],

(Apr.

5,

2009),

https //www.pwecn.com/zh/blog/state-owned-enterprise-soe/review-on-the-reform(archived
mixed-ownership-central-enterprises html [https://perma .c/A8UC-WRYB]

Feb. 17, 2020).
Id.
88.
See Yang Ge, 5 Things to Know About China's Mixed-Ownership Reform,
89.
CAIXIN GLoB. (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-08-28/5-things-to[https://perma.ce/MG4Mknow-about-chinas-mixed-ownership-reform-101136807.html
PMJA] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
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In selecting such private-sector investors, the SOE looks more at
factors such as management experience, technology, or development of
new products or markets, rather than financial investment.9 0 In any
event, MOR will lead to substantial reduction of state ownership in the
SOE concerned. Table 3 shows the change in ownership and board

composition in thirty-one SOEs, which covers most of the completed
MOR programmes in SOEs selected by the Chinese government for
such reform. 9 1
Table 3: Change of Ownership and Board Composition in Selected

MOR Cases 9 2
MOR

Shareholdtin

7

Board

Board

Conposition

C ompan

Pre MOR

Post-'MOR

Y

St

Shar

St

Shar

E

Sta

Priva

lndr

Wo

Stat

Poiv

Ind

Empl

at

ehtl

ate

ehol

m,

tr

to

pend

rke

e

ate

epe

o yr

z

ding

sh

ding

tly

Rep

Strot

ent

r

Repr

Stra

nde

Ropr

Sh

of

ate

of

ee

res

egic

Re

eun

tegie

nt

Othe

hol

Priv

Sh

not

pre

tato

Invo

Dire

eh

r

din

't

ar

atio

tors

sen

n

stos

et.,

ol

Shar

g

Stra

oh

n

Repr

tat

Bepr

di

ehot

tegic

old

esett

o

esen

ng

dors

Itt-

iog

ation

or

Pre-MOR

Post-MOR

n-vos

ire
otor

Chair

eent
ation

tatio

,tors
62

372

37

.251

57.

Iiomt

:7

6%

0'%

0%

1'.
(4/7

4

Hefei

liagha
n

to

0%

76

241,

100

091

42.9

0%

23

1

38.2

385

0'.

Stato

0%

Stat

%

China-

(3/7)

(3/13

(5113

%

I

7.1

42.9

(4/7)

(317)

(5/1
.

1)
0%

0%
%

Aircraft
Equipm

&

90.
Opinion of the State Council, supra note 50, at Points 9-15.
91.
See infra Table 3.
92.
Sources: Sina Finance, Xinhuanet, IDC News, Cailianshe, Diyicaijing, Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission News, China Storage
Transport Magazine, CAAC News, Sunshine Law Firm, Cdmwjj News, PEdaily,
Shanghai Securities News, QQ News, China Economic Net, JRJ.com, 21st Century
Business Herald, China Venture Investment Consulting News, National Business Daily,
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China News, Xintuoshop.com, CITIC-CP Asset
Management Company News, EFN China, Jianshu, Everbright Securities Report, China
Railway Engineering Consulting Group News, Tianjin Xintuo Zixun Menhu, Phoenix
New Media Finance, Sina Medicine, Sohu News, MP Consulting Group, LexisNexis,
Xuehua News, Wolters Kluwer, China Mining, Wsxm.net, People's Daily Online, Toushi
Jinfu, Xunmeng News, Changjiang Securities Report, Time-Weekly, Qichacha.com
Hexunicom, Xinde Marine News, Ouyeel.com
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B. MOR Case Studies

1. China Unicom MOR
China Unicom, China's third largest and the world's fourth largest
telecom operator (by number of subscribers), was among the first group
93
of SOEs chosen by the Chinese government to undergo MOR. China
Unicom implemented a controversial MOR through its Shanghai-listed
subsidiary, China United Network Communications (CUNC). 94 In
August 2017 CUNC announced a sale of shares, representing 37

percent of the firm's shares, to fourteen strategic investors for ¥78
billion RMB ($11.7 billion USD). These investors, including several of
China's star firms such as Alibaba Group, Tencent Holdings, Baidu
Inc., JD.com, Inc., China Life Insurance, and a few private equity
firms, can be classified into four categories: (1) internet companies in
China; (2) leading companies in industry verticals; (3) financial
95
institutions; and (4) specialist funds.
As can be seen from Chart 1, before the implementation of MOR,
the Unicom Group held 62.7 percent of the shares in CUNC, while the
96
other 37.3 percent of the shares were held by public shareholders.
After the reform, the Unicom Group's shareholding decreased to 36.7
97
percent and the strategic investors held 35.2 percent of the shares.
The remaining shares are held by employees as employee incentive
98
China
shares (2.7 percent) and public shareholders (25.4 percent).
Unicom Group, while still the largest shareholder of CUNC, became a
minority shareholder after the MOR.

93.

See 19 s1

/T

3O9

5Ol

O 3000 OJ{Mixed-Ownership Reform of 19 State-

owned Enterprises Expected to Draw 300bn Yuan], P
4,

2017),

iiE*V [CHINA SEC. DAILY] (Dec.

http://news.hexun.com/2017-12-04/191856565.html

[https://perma.cc/4L79-

VFFA] (archived Feb. 17, 2020); see also Clare Jim & Julie Zhu, State-Owned China

-

Unicom to Raise $12 billion from Alibaba, Tencent, Others, REUTERS. Aug. 16, 2017,
https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-chinaunicom-results/state-owned-china-unicom-toraise-12-billion-from-alibaba-tencent-others-idUSKCN1AWOJP [https://perma.cc/F8P4ZPVH] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
94. Fan Feifei, China Unicom Shakeup a Milestone in SOE Reform, CHINA DAILY
7
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/20l
2017),
18,
(Aug.
2020);
17,
Feb.
08/18/content_30763797.htm [https://perma.cc/FR8H-36QV] (archived
see also Huang Kaixin et al., China Unicorn Dials Up Private Capital in Ownership
Reform, CAIXIN GLOB. (Aug. 27, 2017), https://wwwcaixinglobal.comi/2017-08-27/chinaunicom-dials-up-private-capital-in-ownership-reform-101136368.html
[https://perma.cc/TT8P-NFUQ] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
See infra Table 4.
95.
See CHINA UNICOM (H.K.) LIMITED, 2017 CORPORATE SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY
96.
https://www.chinaunicom.com.hk/en/csr/reports/csr2017.pdf
(2017),
7
REPORT
(archived Feb. 17, 2020) [hereinafter UNIcOM
[https://perma.cc/ZML9-RHXU]
CORPORATE REPORT]; see also Kaixin et al.,s upra note 94.
UNICOM CORPORATE REPORT, supra note 96, at 7.
97.
98.
Id.
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Chart 1: CUNC's Pre- and Post-MOR Equity Structure
Shareholding

Pre-MOR

Structure

Unicorn A Share Company's Post-

MOR Shareholding Structure

Unicom

Strategic

Employee

Public

Group

Investors

Incentive

Shareholders

36.7%

35.2 %

2.7%

25.4%

Unicom A Share
Company (600050

CH)

Unicom

Public

Group

shareholders

"

investors

subscribed for about
billion new
shares

62.7%
37.3%

9
of

Unicom A Share Company
and purchased 1.90 billion
shares of Unicom A Share
Company from Unicom

Unicorn A
7.9%

Strategic

Share
Company

Group,

representing

in

aggregate 35.2 percent of
Unicom
A
Share

1000

82.1%

Company's enlarged share

capital, at a of price RMB
6.83 per share.
Unicom

Unicom

Public

Group

"

shareho
filers

33.13%

25.6%s

Unicom

"

Red Chip
Company

Key

employees

were

granted about 850 million
restrictive
shares
of
Unicom A Share Company
at a price of RMB 3.79 per
share.
Total consideration was
about RMB 78 billion.

Source: China Unicom 9 9

99.

x`-M
2017 *0AV2

See

Interim Results], C

1 A

[Mixed Ownership Reform and 2017

[CHINA UNICOM] 6 (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.chinaunicom-
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The MOR led to the expansion of CUNC's board of directors from
seven to thirteen members, in which five are independent directors.
Among the eight nonindependent directors, only three were appointed
by Unicom Group:1 00 That is, the strategic investors, including China
Life Insurance and the four tech giants, now have appointed five
directors to the board.1 01 According to CUNC's own announcement, the
new board composition aimed to "establish sound and well-coordinated
corporate governance with effective checks-and-balances" and to
"strengthen the Board's authorities in critical decision-making,
102
personnel selection and appointment and compensation allocation.,"

Table 4: CUNC Board Composition before mixed ownership reform (as
of August 12, 2016)103
Board of Directors
Position/Other Info

Name

Representing the State Company
Chairman and Party Secretary of China
Wang Xiaochu (il]J)
1
Unicom
Vice Chairman/General Manager of
([fd%)
Yimin
Lu
2
China Unicorn Group

3
4

Li Fushen (4-4i4)
Shao Guanglu (nl3

i)

Director/Chief Financial Officer
Director/Senior Vice President of China
Unicom

Independent Directors

)

5

Lu Tingjie (°

6

Chen Yonghong

7

Li Hongbin (Tri)

(1,#< )

Independent

Director/Professor

at

of Posts and
Beijing University
Telecommunications
Independent Director/Certified public
accountant
Director/Professor
Independent
Peking University

at

a.com/wem/1/attachments/2017/8/21/1226/1503248411683.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GNHG8DP] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
ca $$_TD7
3 Gil$$ % -l [Interuiew
k 1f $
iT'
@@
100.
with Party Secretary and Chairman Wang Xiaochu of China Unicom], XINHUA Ni:Ws
http://www.xinhuanet.com/info/2018-12/17/c_137679731.htm
2018),
17,
(Dec.
[https://perma.cc/RY9K-96PB] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
101. Id.
102. See Wang Xiaochu, Mixed-Ownership Reform & 2017 Interim Results
(Aug.
UNICOM
Presentation Transcript, CHINA
Announcement
https://www.chinaunicom.co.hk/en/ir/transcript/transcript 17ir.pdf

21,

2017),

[https://perma.cc/23LD-NKQ5] (archived Apr. 26, 2020).
103. See TIANYANCHA, https://www.tianyancha.com/company/863877372 (last
visited Aug. 12, 2019) [https://perma.c/9XQR-H2NL] (archived Apr. 26, 2020) (providing
registration information about China Unicorn).
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Table 5: CUNC Board Composition after mixed ownership reform 0 4
Board of Directors
Name
Representing the State
1
Wang Xiaochu (¶H-.0)
2

Li Guohua (4E M

3

Li Fushen (t'T;'tI)

Position/Other Info
Chairman and Party Secretary of China
Unicom
General Manager, Deputy Secretary of
the Party Group, Director of China
Unicom
Deputy Secretary and Director of the

)

Party

Group of China

Unicom

Representing the strategic investors
4

Liao Jianwen (J2

1)

5

Yin Zhaojun (ffjkI

)

6

Lu Shan (P Ii)

7

Wang Lu (IErm)

8

Zhang Jianfeng (
Note:

ll-

K-W)

replaced

MHj

Nonindependent
Director/Chief
Strategy Officer of JD.com
Nonindependent Director/Chairman of
China Life Investment Holdings Co.,
Ltd.
Nonindependent
Director/Senior
Executive Vice President and President
of Technology Engineering Group of
Tencent
Nonindependent Director/Baidu Vice
President
Nonindependent
Director/Alibaba
Chief Technology Officer and President

of Alibaba Cloud Intelligence Group

fl on July 5, 2019.
Independent Directors
9
Wu Xiaogen ( -[]k)

10

Lu Tingjie (' l~)

11

Ma Shidong (.i:

Independent Director/Professor at the
School
of
Accounting,
Zhejiang
Zhangzhou Economics University
Independent
Director/Professor
at
Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications

L;

Independent

Director/Engineer/
Previously a deputy secretary of State
Development & Investment Corp.

104. Management
Profile:
China
Unicom,
EASTMONEY,
http://f10.eastmoneycom/f10_v2/CompanyManagementaspx?code=sh600050#glcjj-0
(last visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3CHP-NZP4] (archived Feb. 17, 2020)
(providing a full biography of each director),

20201
12

Chen Jianxin (

f/i)

Independent Director/A retired director
of

13
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Xiong Xiaoge (fii)
Note: 3G II 1 <f tendered his

the

Finance

Department

of

the

General Office of the Chinese Ministry
of Personnel
Independent Director

resignation as director on
July 5, 2019. There is no
known replacement for him.

2. Eastern Air Logistics

Eastern Air Logistics Co., Ltd. (EAL) is the logistics arm of China
Eastern Air Holding Company (China Eastern), one of China's biggest

airlines.1 05 It started MOR in June 2017, becoming the first SOE in the
aviation sector to pursue such reform. Through the MOR, China
Eastern sold almost half its equity stake in EAL to four strategic
investors, namely Legend Holdings (20 percent), Global Logistic
Properties (GLP) (10 percent), Deppon Logistics (5 percent) and
Greendland Financial (5 percent). China Eastern kept a 45 percent
stake in EAL. EAL's key employees were granted 10 percent of the
firm's ownership.10 6
EAL's board of directors after the MOR comprised nine members,
five of which were appointed by China Eastern, two by Legend
Holdings, one by the Singaporean investor GLP, and the last one by
the employee shareholders. 107 This ensured the state controlling
shareholder, China Eastern, a simple majority while leaving the
nonstate shareholders a veto power on the board on issues concerning

105. Air China, China Southern Air, and China Eastern are the three biggest
airlines in China in terms of the possession of registered aircrafts and shipping capacity.
LF [Research Report of 2017
JIflif
See UNITED CREDIT RATINGs Co. LTD., 1}Lf=
2017),
Industry]
(Dec.
the
Air-Thansport
on
[https://perma.cc/F59Shttp://pdf.dfcfw-com/pdf/H3_AP201712141066423114_1.pdf
CR9N] (archived Feb. 17, 2020); see also China Eastern Airlines Corp. Ltd. Profile,
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020)
REUTERS. https://www.reuters.com/companies/CEA
[https://perma.cc/P794-WD2X] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
106. Of the four strategic investors, Legend Holding, parent of the personal
computer giant Lenovo Group Ltd., is a private company, GLP is a Singaporean
company while Deppon Logistics and Greeland Financial are two private companies.
Brenda Goh, China Eastern Sells Stakes in Cargo Unit to Four Firms, REUTERS, June
19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-eastern-cargo-idUSKBN19AWS
[https://perma.cc4EY7-8AFH] (archived Mar. 19, 2020).
) [Draft
(A$tM
IE I i iiI3
A RI
fft
107.
Prospectus of Eastern Air Logistics Co., Ltd. For Initial Public Offering of A Shares] 22830,
7 86 7
03.pdf
4
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306202/201907/P02019070557155
(last visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QCR8-PJWS] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
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corporate investment and budgets, according to EAL's prospectus for

initial public offering (IPO) in China's stock market. 108 In December
2018, EAL was entirely converted into a joint stock company, Eastern
Air Logistics Co., Ltd., and added four independent directors to its

board. 0 9
3. Sinopec MOR
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, popularly known as
Sinopec, is a Chinese central SOE headquartered in Beijing and one of
and
petrochemical
largest
oil
refining,
gas,
the
world's
conglomerates. 110 Sinopec was included in the first batch of SOEs

selected for MOR by Chinese authorities and hence was one of the
earliest MOR cases. ll In September 2014, Sinopec entered into a
capital contribution agreement with twenty-five domestic and foreign
investors to sell 29.5849 percent of its shares in Sinopec Marketing Co.,
a subsidiary then wholly owned by Sinopec.1"2 After the MOR, Sinopec
still held about 70 percent of the subsidiary's total shares. 1 1 3
It must be noted that this MOR did not bring significant change
in ownership in favor of private investment, because six of the strategic

investors are state-owned companies (including China Life Insurance
and China Tobacco) and eleven of the strategic investors are statecontrolled asset management companies or private equity houses. 1 4
Real private and foreign investors only acquired 9.826 percent of the
total shares in the MOR.' 15 Moreover, critics have also pointed out that
the twenty-five investors are sharing approximately 30 percent of the
shares, and this means that each shareholder will hold no more than
2.8 percent of the shares.1 6 However, changes in board composition do
show an early sign of the trend that a larger representation could be
given to investors introduced through MOR, which in many later MOR
cases appeared to be nonstate investors. In the case of Sinopec

108. See id. at 67 (noting China Eastern owns forty-five percent of EAL).
109. Id. at 54.
GRP
Us,
SINoPEc
generally
About
110. See
(last
http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/companyprofile/AboutSinopecGroup/
visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/698T-GLYY] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
111. Matthew Miller & Charlie Zhu, China's Sinopec Sale Points to Next Round of
State Privatization, REUTERS, Mar. 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinaparliament-soe/chinas -sinopec-sale-points-to-next-round-of-state-privatizationidUSBREA2223820140303 [https://perma.cc/P9J7-Z9J2] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
112. Shirley Yam, Sinopec Offers Master Class in SOE Mixed Ownership Reform,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 20, 2014), https://www.scmp.com/business/chinabusiness/article/1596467/sinopec-offers-masterclass-soe-mixed-ownership -reform
[https://perma.cc/2VKC-6ZME] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.

20201
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Marketing, before the MOR all the seven directors were appointed by
the parent company, Sinopec Corporation. After the MOR, Sinopec

Corporation appointed four of the eleven directors on the board.

117

However, all the other four nonindependent directors were appointed

by state-linked shareholders.
Table 6: Sinopec Marketing Board before mixed ownership reform (as

of March 30, 2015)
Board of Directors1
Name

18

Position/Other Info

Representing the State/ Sinopec
Director/Chairman and Secretary of
Zhang Haichao (38)
1
CPC Committee of Sinopec Sales Co.

2

Lu Pin (° u)

3

Zuo Xing Kai (

Director/Executive Deputy General
Manager of Sinopec Sales Co./
General Manager of Sinopec Sales
Hubei Branch
Director/Executive Deputy General

'J1)

Manager of Sinopec Sales Co.
)

4

Liu Xionghua (fJt

5

Liu Quanying (iJM)

6

Liu Zurong

7

Zhao Jinhui (fA'i

(!J

Director/Executive Deputy General

Manager of Sinopec Sales Co./
General Manager of Sinopec Sales
Beijing Branch

r)
)

Director/Employee's Representative
Supervisor of Sino ec Corp.
of
Accountant
Director/Chief

Sinopec Sales Co.
An executive in Sinopec Sales Co.
but

no

detailed

information

regarding his exact position

-

117. See infra `ables 6 and 7.
3 74
89
b-a
118. See QI XIN, https://www.qixin.comlcompany/9fc38553-c8ra-4
001f7e87d945 (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B25K-9WSX] (archived Feb.
19, 2020).
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Table 7: Sinopec Marketing Board after mixed ownership reform

Board of Directors 1 9
Name

Position/Other Info

Representing the State/ Sinopec

1

Zhao Rifeng (LX

E Ill)

Note: Zhao Rifeng (LX H
l1
) replaced Zhang
Haichao

(p( i

Director/Chairman
and
Secretary of CPC Committee of
Sinopec Sales Co.

) on

January 29, 2018.120

2

Xia Shixiang (A

)

Director/Vice
Chairman/General Manager of

Sinopec Sales Co.
3

Yu Renming (nfC

Director/Employee's
Representative Supervisor

of

Sinopec Corp.
4

Xu Weidong (i'FJ

)

Director/Executive
General Manager

Sales

Zhao Xuejun (AX* )

Deputy
Sinopec

Co.

Representing the outside investors
Vice Chairman
Lan Yunsheng ('":yt)
5

6

of

National
Corporation
Nonindependent

of the China

Petroleum

Director/Secretary of the Party
Committee of Harvest Fund

7

Zhang Yuling (%i

'7)

Nonindependent
Director/Deputy

General

Manager of Huaxia Fund and
CEO of Huaxia Fund Hong
Kong
8

Wang Wei (OI)

Nonindependent Director/Vice
Chairman, President and Party

119. See IFENG, http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20151228/14139747_0shtml
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.ccIVTH7-YBGS] (archived Feb. 24, 2020);
ZHONGGUO
PETROLEUM
&
CHEM.
SALES
CO.
LTD.,
https:zdb.pedaily.cn/enterprise/show7895/
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/6YTF-B7CC]
(archived
Mar.
19,
2020);
QICHACHA,
https://www.qichacha.com/firmb0335502875cd0358aab6722b44f8058.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/EY3D-TV6L] (Feb. 27, 2020).
120. On January 29, 2018, Mr. Zhang Haichao resigned as director member of
Strategy Committee of the Board, and the Senior Vice President of Sinopec Corp. due to
his age. See SINOPEC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 77 (2018).
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of
Secretary
Management

PICC

Asset

Independent Directors

9

Hu Wenrui (M

J)

Independent
Petroleum

Director/China
Association

President/ Chinese Academy of

Engineering Academician

Lf)

10

Zhou Guomin (F

11

Ning Xiangdong (%]2

Director/Chief
Independent
Financial Officer of Houpu

)

Investment
Independent Director/Professor
at Tsinghua University School

of Economics and Management
4. Yunnan Baiyao MOR
Yunnan Baiyao (YNBY) is a time-honoured pharmaceutical brand
for traditional Chinese medicine based in Yunnan Province of
Southwestern China. It existed, in legal form, as Yunnan Baiyao Group
Co., Ltd. (YNBY Group) and its parent company Yunnan Baiyao

Holdings (YNBY Holdings) under the umbrella of the Yunnan SASAC.
Since 2016, YNBY Group and YNBY Holdings have undergone a twostage MOR process.12 1
In the first stage, two major strategic investors were introduced

as new shareholders of YNBY Holdings. In December 2016, YNBY
Holdings issued new shares to Fujian-based private company, New
Huadu Industrial Group (New Huadu), granting it 50 percent of YNBY

Holdings' total ownership.12 2 In April 2017, the board of directors of
YNBY Holdings was reconstituted, and New Huadu and Yunnan
1 23
The chairmanship of
SASAC each nominated two board members.
chairman of Zijin
former
the
was
who
Jianhua,
the board went to Wang

121. See David Blair & Li Yingging, Traditional Pharma Firm Furthers Reform
2019),
22,
(Feb.
DAILY
CHINA
Efforts,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/22/WS5c6f5c6aa3l 06c65c34eac72.html
[https://perma.cc/HV57-UT2E] (archived Feb. 8, 2020); see also Local SOEs and Mixed
Ownership Reform to See More Progress, XINHUIA FIN. AGENCY (Aug. 14, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/G6FFhttp://en.xfafinance.com/html/DontMiss/2017/353884.shtml
WP99] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
1 LI i![SO E's Mixed Ownership Reform. Yunnan Baiyao
122. See C
9
as a Case Study] (Feb. 14, 2017), http:I/www.sohu.com/a/126242948_4814 5
[https://perma.cC/Q79F-LLSX] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
( 4' [Yunnan Bkaiyao Completed Its
l:i
kkykA&
d/i
e
123. See
MO, Chen Chunhua from New luadu Appointed a I)irector] (Apr. 20, 2017),
2
[https://perma.ce/EG8Chttps://xw.qq.com/cmsid/20170420008301/ 017042000830100
9ZA4 (archived Feb. 8, 2020) [hereinafter Yunnan Baiyao (CompletedIts MOR].
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Mining, a private company in which New Huadu had substantial
ownership. 124 The former chairman of YNBY Holdings, Wang
Minghui, was subsequently appointed as the chairman of YNBY Group

and the CEO of YNBY Holdings. 1 25
To avoid a deadlock in decision making, a second sale, totaling 10
percent of YNBY Holdings' ownership, was made in June 2017 to
Jiangsu Yuyue Technology Development Co. (Jiangsu Yuyue), a
private manufacturer of medical equipment. 126 Consequently, the
Yunnan Provincial Government and New Huadu each hold 45 percent

of YNBY Holdings' total shares.12 7
Of the two strategic investors, New Huadu was expected to help

establish market-based business models for Yunnan Baiyao, while
Jiangsu Yuyue would help to improve the firm's corporate
governance. 128 With a new board member nominated by Jiangsu
Yuyue, the board of YNBY Holdings was expanded to five members. 129

The first stage of YNBY Holdings' MOR was thus completed, which
resulted in several changes in its corporate governance, including,
notably,

the appointment of Chen Fashu, the founder and board

chairman of New Huadu, as the board chairman of YNBY Holdings in
July 2018.130 Moreover, senior executives of YNBY Holdings would no
longer be treated as government officials but would become
"professional managers" (zhiye jingliren) as if they were hired from the

labour market. 13 1
The second stage of the MOR process involved the merger of

YNBY Holdings into its listed subsidiary YNBY Group. The plan was
announced in November 2018 and the merger was successfully
completed through a share swap in July 2019.132 The Yunnan SASAC,
New Huadu, and Jiangsu Yuyue now own 25.14 percent, 24.37 percent,
and 5.59 percent of the shares of YNBY Group, respectively. 13 3 The
identity and information of board candidates of the new YNBY Group
were released in August 2019, pending an election in the near
future. 134 The new combined enterprise would be expected to have
greater synergy in its business operations by consolidating YNBY

124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
Blair & Yingqing, supra note 121.
id.
id.
MI~Jin ,, l, ),j.- (f FI mh 1Th iIn Q

[PUBLIc DISCLOSURE

BY YUNNAN BAIYAO Co. LTD. ON CHANGE OF REGISTRATION

130.

INFORMATION]

(2020).

i I# nR
%J
lT Ak (1F.: X ),r K1 R1.; { J[PUBLIC

DISCLOSURE BY YUNNAN BAIYAO Co. LTD. ON CHANGE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE,
CHAIRMAN OF BOARD, AND DIRECTORS] (2017).

131.
132.
133.
134.

Yunnan Baiyao Completed Its MO, supra note 123.
See Blair & Yingqing, supra note 121.
See id.
See id.
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Holdings' financial resources and YNBY Group's expertise in product
manufacturing, marketing, research and development, and human
resources. 135

IV. IMPACT OF THE MIXED OWNERSHIP REFORM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN SOEs
This Part analyses the change brought to corporate governance of

SOEs by the MOR programme. The change is being driven by both
policy/regulatory initiatives and emerging practices in implementing
MOR. On MOR firms' corporate governance, the SOE Reform
Guidelines set out a wide range of objectives that in summary aim to

provide effective checks and balances, board independence, efficiency
in decision-making, directorial accountability, and also Party
control. 1 3 6 As a summary, the new governance framework has the
following features:

1) The CCP is being institutionalized in the formal corporate
governance mechanisms of SOEs;
2) The state/government has been asked to retreat from SOE
governance and not to interfere with the day-to-day management
at the firm level. A wide span of regulatory measures have been
released to grant more autonomy to SOEs;
3) The SOE board is expected to exercise independent power in
deciding issues concerning personnel appointments, performance

evaluation, and staff salary.13 7

The puzzle now is how to make sense of these apparently selfcontradictory corporate governance objectives. Based on the recent
general policy design for SOE reform, regulatory measures, and
governance practices at firm level, it is submitted that MOR is likely
to generate a partnership-based consultative governance model, in
which Party leadership coexists with a board that has a certain degree
of independence in the decision-making process. Such a model will
in corporate
committee's involvement
the Party
strengthen
governance, but does not necessarily undermine the autonomy of the
SOE in making independent decisions if the following conditions are
met: (1) the Chinese government stays away from the management of

135.

See id.

136. See Barry Naughton, State EnterpriseReform Today, in CHINA's 40 YEARS OF
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: 1978-2018, at
[hereinafter Naughton, State Enterprisel.
137. See infra Parts IVA, IV.13, IV.C.

375

(Ross Garnaut et al.

eds., 2018)
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the firm; (2) the role of the Party committee, institutionalized or not,
does not emasculate the SOE in making decisions as a commercial

entity as a whole; and (3) the board of directors is given a high degree
of independence in making managerial decisions. 138
The survey below indicates that, from policy and regulatory
perspectives, the role of the Chinese government in SOEs is clearly
undergoing dramatic transformation, and the state has been asked to
refrain from directly interfering in SOE management. The
involvement of the Party committee does not necessarily denote
politicization of corporate governance in SOEs, but instead there
generally appears to be cooperation, a separation of power, and
responsibility in the relationship between the Party committee and the
board.
A. The State Retreats; Capital Management to Enable Enterprise

Autonomy
The essence of shifting from "asset management" to "capital
management" requires the state to act generally as an owner of state
capital and care mainly about the general direction of state investment
and value appreciation of the state's wealth in SOEs. 13 9 This move
involves redefining the role of the state as well as reasserting the
autonomy of the SOEs to run their own businesses. Thus, from the
state's perspective, it means "separation of government functions and
enterprises" (zhengqi fenkai) and "separation of government functions
and capital," as stated in the State Council's reform plan on state

capital. 140
Reform measures adopted since 2015 fairly suggest that the
separation of the state (government) from the SOEs has been
formalized from policy and regulatory perspectives. These measures
form two major reform programmes: (i) creating state capital
investment and operation companies to add a layer between SASAC

138. In essence, the three conditions require, for the sake of effective corporate
governance, an adequate separation of ownership and control while recognizing
pragmatically the role of the CCP in SOEs.
139. N Mj [Hao Peng], AJkMW
k/k4f
M0 klfk9AE
[Accelerating the Change from Enterprise Management to Capital Management
f$-/I
and Forming a New State Assets Regulatory Regime based on Capital Management],
STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMM'N OF THE STATE COUNCIL (Dec. 12,
2019), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n4470048/n10286230/n12924139/n12924144/c12927371/
content.html [https;//perma.cc/3C4X-KYVA] (archived Feb. 8, 2020). Note the author,
Hao Peng, is the Chairman of SASAC.
140.
XYifi
R=
11h [Notice by the State Council of Issuing the Plan
for Reforming the State-Owned Capital Authorized Operation System], PEKING UNIV.
(Apr. 19, 2019), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=c65426284846a8bchdfb&lib-law
[https://perma.cc/A2JV-CAB4] (archived Feb. 20, 2020) (China).
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and SOEs and redefining the role and functions of SASAC and (ii)
adopting a negative-listing approach in passing autonomy to SOEs

while removing power from SASAC. 14 1
1. Creation of State Capital Investment and Operation Companies and

Redefining the Role of SASAC.
Since SASAC was established in 2003 as the modern "ownership
agency" of China's state capitalism, it has been both the regulator of
1 42
Flaws have been seen in both roles.
and the state investor in SOEs.
As a regulator, its objective was very ambiguous. One may wonder
whether there is any need for a regulator of SOEs, since no such
specialized watchdog exists for privately owned enterprises. Probably
for such reasons, SASAC is not treated officially as a ministry in
China's bureaucratic structure. Rather, it is called a "specialized

agency directly under the State Council" (Guowuyuan Zhishu Tebie
Jigou), 143 indicating it is not unequivocally regarded as a state
regulator, although it has certainly exercised regulatory powers in
terms of making policies and conducting institutional consolidation for
SOE reform since its creation.1 44 But, as an owner, it was not put in
the position to properly exercise the two main functions of ownership:
45
That is, SOEs do
receiving dividends and voting as a shareholder.'

not pay dividends to SASAC,

and SASAC

does not hold the

appointment power for senior positions in SOEs because
14 6
appointment power is exercised by the CCP in practice.

the

The 2015 SOE Reform Guidelines proposed to redefine SASACSOE relations by adding an additional layer between SASAC and the

;

e
141. See R&\@
7i [Programme of the State
Council on Functional Transformationof the Role of the SASAC to CapitalManagement],
2017),
(Apr.
27,
Part
II:3
STATE
COUNCIL,
OF THE
OFFICE
GEN.
http://www.gov.cn/zhengee/content/2017-05/I10/content_5192390.htm
[https://perma.ce/AF5Q-B76J] (archived Feb. 8. 2020) [hereinafter SASAC Reform
Programme] (providing that the SASAC would not directly regulate the behavior of the
state shareholder in listed companies).
142. WANG, supranote 2, at 652-53; see also Barry Naughton, The Transformation
of the State Sector: SASAC, the Market Economy, and the New National Champions, in
STATE CAPITALISM,

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTATION, AND THE CHINESE MIRACLE 46,

48

(Barry Naughton & Kellee S. Tsai eds., 2015).
143. See 0 _n eP 9R /4Y [OrganizationalStructure of the State Council],
2020)
19,
Mar.
visited
(last
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/zuzhi.htm
[https://perma.cc/E89Y-LX98] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
144. See Barry Naughton, SASAC and Rising CorporatePower in China, 24 CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1 (discussing SASAC's roles as an owner and regulator); see also
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE
IN CHINA 311 (2005) [hereinafter OECD, GOVERNANCE IN CHINA] (explaining the
portfolio of SASAC's original regulatory powers).
145. See NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 59.
146. See id. at 59-61.

1092

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:1055

SOEs with the creation of state capital investment and operation
companies (SCIOs).14 7 The SCIOs are either state capital investment
companies (SCIs) or state capital operation companies (SCOs). 148
Established under the auspices of SASAC or directly under the
government, the SCIOs are authorized to act in the capacity of the
state shareholder in state-invested firms.1 4 9 The SCIOs are required to
behave as shareholders in accordance with the PRC Company Law and
related regulations, and participate in the governance of the SOEs
through nominating directors and supervisors and voting in
shareholders' meetings. 150 In addition, they are expected to be
financial investors mainly concerned with financial returns rather
than management.1 51
The role of SASAC is thus modified to be the special agency
authorized by the State Council to function as the ultimate state
investor to manage state capital and oversee state investments. 1 5 2 It is
the state shareholder in many of the SCIOs.1 53 `However, it is those
SCIOs which will be the investors/owners on behalf of the state in

See NAUGHrON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 297-328.
The state capital operation companies (SCOs) are entrusted to manage state
capital, i.e. state shareholding in companies, with the view to maximizing the value of
state assets. They are expected to serve as financial investors in SOEs or non-SOEs
which operate on commercial basis. State capital investment companies (SCIs) are
basically industrial investment funds which invest on behalf of the state in sectors
"relating to national security or the commanding heights of the national economy"
presumably for the purpose of promoting industrial policies. See
A[94M-iffiftYiN
147.
148.

`S.
[Opinions of the State Council on Implementation
JL i
,? kiJ
*Y% g
of Pilots of State Capital Investment and Operation Companies], STATE COUNCIL Part II
(July 14, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-07/30/content_5310497.htm
[https://perma.cc/87HP-4F6N] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
149. H [n
[&-.Th #MH fi
tPrr'J
,2J4'
T.f,
[Several Opinions of the
State Council on Reforming and Perfecting State-owned Assets Management System],
STATE COUNCIL Points 8-9 (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201511/04/contentj10266.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3JDW-WLXH]
(archived Feb. 8, 2020).
150. Supra note 49, at Part 11.5.
151. Supra note 149, at Point 9. One of the two centrally created state capital
operation companies is China Reform Holdings Corp. Ltd., known as "Guoxin" See
Naughton, State Enterprise, supra note 136, at 386. Surveying the investment practice
of Guoxin, Barry Naughton observed that Guoxin exercised "a financial ownership stake
in many firms without having the additional regulatory and command-and-control
functions that SASAC had." Id. at 387.
152. See SASAC Reform Programme, supra note 141, at Part 1.2.
153. -k t [Wang Jiang], jjJ,7/f/
7
i w2i. , k f ,/ t Ai [A
Contemporary Survey of the Operational Features State Capital Investment and
Operation Companies and the Prospect for Future Reform], ECON. OBSERVER (Aug. 10,
2019), http://www.eeo.com.en/2019/0810/363306.shtml
[https://perma.cc/R83K-ZY5)]
(archived Feb. 8, 2020) (noting nineteen state capital management companies and two
state capital operation companies were established under the umbrella central SASAC
and a total of 142 SCIOs were established by local SASACs).
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SOEs. As a result, a layer between SASAC and the SOEs is established.
Thus, the SASAC is now neither a regulator which performs public
administrative functions, nor a direct shareholder in the SOEs. It is
explicitly disallowed by the State Council to interfere with the
54
independence and autonomy of SOEs.1
2. A Negative-List Approach to Grant Autonomy to SOEs
One of the mysteries about state-business relations in China is
what oversight powers SASAC has over SOEs. As noted, SASAC was
launched as an ownership agency with the "core mission . . . to carry
out the government's functions as investor and owner of state assets,
and thus separate these tasks from the government's role as public

5
manager of society as a whole." 1 5 Before the recent round of SOE

reform, SASAC's original duties included: (i) functioning as the state
investor in SOEs; (ii) representing the state on the supervisory board
of large SOEs; (iii) appointing, dismissing, and assessing senior
executives; 15 6 (iv) monitoring the change of value in state assets in
SOEs; (v) drafting regulations and rules on the administration of
157
SOEs; and (vi) directing and advising SOEs under local ownership.

This ambiguous portfolio demonstrates that SASAC was powerful,
even though SASAC rarely exercised such powers. Quite ironically, the
2017 SASAC Reform Programme, which was supposed to grant

enterprise autonomy back to state firms, tellingly revealed how allembracing and intrusive SASAC's powers were in theory. 158 For
instance, the Programme displayed forty-three items which
represented the powers to be given to SOEs, of which twenty-six items
1 59
concerned the powers which SASAC had given up.

Furthermore, through the Reform Programme SASAC decided to
authorize the boards of central SOEs to exercise powers including
formulating the firm's five-year plan for strategic development and the
annual investment plan, appointing the members of the firm's
managerial team, evaluating their performance, determining their
16 0
salaries, and approving the gross payroll of the firm, among others.
Implicitly, the fact that SASAC explicitly gave up those powers now
indicates that they were originally held by SASAC in the first place.
In April 2019, the State Council decided to adopt a negative-list

approach (qingdan guanli) to transfer to SOEs authority to exercise

154.

See SASAC Reform Programme, supra note 141, at Part 1.2.

155.
156.

NAUGHToN, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 316.

157.

OECD,

Note this was more of a power on paper; as the appointment power for senior
positions in an SOE is always exercised by the CCP.
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA, supra note 144, at 311.

158. See SASAC Reform Programme, supra note 141.
159. See id.
160. See id. at Part III of the Appendix.
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powers which belonged to them according to the PRC Company Law

and would no longer be within SASAC's province. 16 1 The essence of the
approach is that SASAC would produce a list of powers and
responsibilities (quanli zeren qingdan) which would inter alia specify
which powers will be returned to the central SOEs. 162 More
importantly, the SOEs will hold the residual powers (i.e., any power
which is not included in the list will be regarded as, by default,
belonging to the companies rather than SASAC). 163 The guiding
principle for the list is that the SOEs will eventually regain, through
the list, the autonomy legally conferred upon them by the PRC
Company Law and other laws. 164 Under the list, the state
shareholders' reach does not go beyond the board of directors and is
explicitly not allowed to touch on the management of the companies. 165
The first negative list, the SASAC Power Authorization List (2019),
gave twenty-one powers back to central SOEs 166 Significantly, the
SOEs have been allowed to decide on issues concerning MOR of
subsidiaries, asset restructuring of subsidiaries, shareholding change
in nonlisted subsidiaries, bond issuances, hiring of managerial
personnel on market-based principles, approving the dividend
distribution plans of subsidiaries involved in high-tech industries,
extension of business to other areas, etc. 167
B. The CCP Advances: The Role of the Party Organization in SOE
Governance
The retreat of the Chinese government from SOEs, as discussed
above, must be understood in tandem with the fact that the role of the
Party in SOEs has been strengthened and institutionalized in the new

round of SOE reform. Though the Party committee (Dangweihui) is
always a significant part of an SOE's corporate governance according

to official CCP policy as well as the PRC Company Law, 168 in reality,
while the CCP had "maintained representative committees inside

161. See
"±j %ILA
1! ' ltilt [Review of the Mixed-ownership Reform of
Central SOEs], supra note 87, at Part 11.2.
162. The list is "negative" in the sense that SASAC would not exercise any power
which is not explicitly provided in the portfolio of powers reserved for it.
163. See SASAC Reform Programme, supra note 141.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See QFI 7; l] #4
[SASAC of the State Council List on Power
Authorization and Release], STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMM'N OF
THE
STATE
COUNcIL
(June
3,
2019),
http:/www.sasa.gov.cn/n2588030/n2588924/c1 1421043/content.html
[https://perma.cc/K8M2-9DYN (archived Feb. 20, 2020).
167. See id.
168. See Wang, supra note 11, at 655-56.
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69
SOE reform
. . they were often moribund bodies."
since Chinese President Xi Jinping took power in 2012 has however
witnessed the revived role for Party leadership in the formal corporate

SOEs for decades,

.

governance mechanism of SOEs. 170 The SOE Reform Guidelines
officially required "legalization of the status" (fadinghua) of the CCP
committee by mandating that "Party-building work" be included in the
SOEs' articles of association and the legal status of the CCP is
governance
explicitly provided in the enterprise's corporate
structure.171 Significantly, the "leadership system" in the SOE will
follow the principle of "two-way access and cross-holding of positions"
(shuangxiang jinru, jiaocha renzhi), which means candidates
appointed by the Party organization in the SOE will be allowed to hold
positions on the board of directors, the supervisory board, and the
management team, while members of the aforesaid corporate
governance institutions may be selected to be leaders of the Party
organization in the firm. 172 In particular, the guidelines demand
separation of the chairman of the board of directors and the general
manager (CEO), but suggest that the chairman of the board of directors
1 73
and the Party secretary in the company may be the same person.
Numerous Chinese SOEs, including those listed in Hong Kong,
have made provisions for the role of the CCP in their company
constitutions or articles of association. 174 The relevant articles, which
were added to the corporate constitutions by special resolutions of the
shareholders' meetings, often described the Party committee as
playing a core role in "an organized, institutionalized and concrete

169. Tom Mitchell, China's Communist Party Seeks Company Control Before
Reform, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/31407684-8101-1 1e7a4ce- 15b2513eb3ff [https:I/perma.cc/FK9X-MHF9] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
170. See Richard McGregor, How the State Runs Business in China, GUARDIAN
(July 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xijinping-communist-party-state-private-enterprise-huawei [https://perma.cc/4TNS-P623]
(archived Feb. 8, 2020).
171. NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at Part VII (24).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Jennifer Hughes, Chinese Communist Party Writes Itself into Company
Law, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a4b28218-80db- 11e7-94e2c5b903247afd [https:I/perma.cc/EGF2-S9P3] (archived Feb. 8, 2020); Yu Nakamura,
More Companies Are Writing China's Communist Party into Their Charters, NIKKEI
ASIAN REv. (Aug. 24, 2017), https:/asia.nikkei.com/Politics/More-companies-are[https:Hperma.cc/XFQ9-KGZ6]
writing-China-s-Communist-Party-into-their-charters
(archived Feb. 8, 2020) (reporting that 288 of the 3314 companies on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges included provisions reflecting the CCP committee's
preferences). By September 2018, 123 Chinese state-invested companies had revised
their articles of association to include provisions for such purpose. See LI YAO. CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY'S GROSS-ROOTS ORGANISATIONS IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: EAI

BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 1462, i (2019).
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way" and "providing direction [and] managing the overall situation."1 7 5
Significantly, it was a change that placed "the party, rather than the
Chinese state, at the heart of each [SOE]." 1 76 The provisions in the

Articles of Association of ICBC offer a standard formula to illustrate
this change:
Article 13 In accordance with the relevant regulations of the Constitution of the
Communist Party of China and the Company Law of China organizations of the
Communist Party of China (hereinafter the "Party") shall be established; the
Party Committee shall play the core leadership role, providing direction
managing the overall situation and ensuring implementation...
Article 52 The Committee of the Communist Party of China of Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China Limited (hereinafter the "Party Committee") shall be
established within the Bank. The Party Committee shall consist of one secretary,
two deputy secretaries and several other members. The chairman of the board of
directors of the Bank and the secretary of the Party Committee shall be the same
person, and one deputy secretary shall be designated to assist the secretary in
carrying out Party-building work. Eligible members of the Party Committee can
ioin the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the senior management
through legal procedures, while eligible members of the board of directors the
board of supervisors and the senior management can also ioin the Party
Committee in accordance with relevant rules and procedures. Meanwhile,
commissions for discipline inspection shall be established in accordance with
relevant requirements.

Article 53 The Party Committee shall, in accordance with the Constitution of
the Communist Party of China and other internal laws and regulations of the
Party, perform the following duties:
1) Ensure and supervise the Bank's implementation of policies and guidelines of
the Party and the State, and implement maior strategic decisions of the Central
Committee of the Party and the State Council, as well as important work
arrangements of higher-level Party organizations;
2) Strengthen its leadership and gatekeeping role in the management of the
process of selection and appointment of personnel ...
3) [Siupport the shareholders' general meeting, the board of directors, the board
of supervisors and the senior management of the Bank in performing their duties
in accordance with law and support the Congress of Employees in carrying out
its work;

4) Assume the primary responsibility to run the Party comprehensively with
strict discipline . . . and support the Party discipline inspection commissions in
earnestly performing its supervisory responsibilities;

175. Hughes, Chinese Communist Party Writes Itself into Company Law, supra
note 174.

176. Id.
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5) Strengthen the building of the Bank's grassroots Party organizations and of
its contingent of Party members . . and unite and lead officials and employees
bank-wide to devote themselves into the reform and development of the Bank;
177
6) Other material matters that fall within the duty of the Party Committee.

The role of the Party in SOEs has always been the least
understood feature in SOE governance. A 2017 survey of foreign
institutional investors by the Asian Corporate Governance Association
disclosed that 61 percent of the 152 foreign fund managers surveyed
indicated they did not find a "clear and accountable" role of the CCP in
listed companies, but 21 percent were not even aware of the Party
1 78
The aforesaid lengthy provisions
committee's existence in the firms.
in the Articles of Association of ICBC do not provide sufficient clarity
for outsiders to understand what exactly the Party organization does

in SOEs.1 79 However, based on this Article's examination of the policy
and regulatory measures, as well as amendments to the articles of
association of listed SOEs relating to the role of the CCP within these
SOEs, the following points with respect to the role of the Party
committee in SOE governance have become fairly clear: (i) the role of
the Party committee should be provided in the articles of associations
of SOEs; (ii) following the principle of Party Control Cadres in the
political system of China's Party-state, the Party committee reserves
the authority to recommend and select top level personnel for the firm;

(iii) there should be cross-holding of offices by Party committee
members and members of the firm's senior personnel; and (iv) the
Party committee should lead and strengthen the Party-building work
in the firm. What is unclear now is to what extent and at what stage
the Party committee is involved in the firm's decision-making, and
whether this involvement undermines the firm's ability to make

decisions on a commercial basis.
C. Separationof Power between the Party and the Board
With the above discussion about the extensive and growing power
of the Party committee in SOEs, it would sound somewhat ironic to
start any conversation about "board independence" in Chinese SOEs.
As alluded to in the previous discussions, the official documents issued
by the CCP Central, the State Council, and ministries of the Chinese

177. ARTICLES OF ASsOCIATION OF INDUSTIIAL. AND COMMERCIAL BANK
3,
14-15
BANK
OF
CHINA
COMMERCIAL
INDUs.
&
LIMITED,
/
http://v.icbc.com.en/userfiles/Resources/ICBCIID/download 2017/gszcen.pdf

OF

CHINA
(2017),

[https://perma.cc/3VN5-AD8D] (archived Feb. 20, 2020) (emphasis added).
178. JAMIE ALLEN & Li RUI, AWAKENING GOVERNANCE: THE EVOLUTION OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 39 (Asian Corp. Goy. Assoc. 2018).
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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government in relation to the recent round of SOE reform, including

MOR, have raised two apparently contradictory objectives. Namely,
the MOE is expected to both ensure that the board is able to exercise
its powers of management 18 0 and to allow the Party organization to
"play the role of political core" in the SOE and exercise powers in
personnel appointment and other matters. 1
It is thus obvious that the Party-state has established two
"supremes" in corporate governance, since both the board of directors
and the Party organization are prescribed to be the decision-making
bodies in the SOEs.182 The question then is whether there is any
separation of power, or at least division of labour, between the two. On
personnel management, official policy suggests the Party committee

should be in charge of forming the "leading body" (lingdao banzi) of the
SOE, understood as a group of top leaders of the firm including the
chairman of the board, the general manager (Chief Executive Officer),
important deputy general managers, key senior executives, and
important Party committee leaders.18 3 The essence of this policy is that
the board of directors is allowed to appoint members of the managerial
team (who are however not members of the leading body),' 8 4 including
the middle-level corporate officers such as leaders of the various
departments in a company. The board is also the principal body
involved in the day-to-day management of the SOEs even though there

180.
181.

See NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 8, at 179-208.
See id. at Points 24-5.

182.

It is also known as the "twin governance structures" in SOEs. See Wang,

(

supra note 11, at 648-59.
183. For instance, the "leading body" of China Railway Group Limited comprised
seven leaders, including the Chairman of the Board of Directors who was also the
Secretary of the Party Committee, the General Manager who was the Deputy Party
Secretary, a Deputy General Manager, a specialized Party committee members, the
Secretary of the Party's Disciplinary Inspection Committee, the company's Chief
Financial Officer, and the company's General Counsel. See CHINA RY. GRP. LTD., i; t/
Y
0[
y
[Leading
Body
of
the
Company],
http://www.crecg.com/chinazt/1116/1120/31752/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/55F9-WV6Q] (archived Feb. 8, 2020).
184. See 40 t
9fth~i l/ '/Ljf t f
JIl
9`F/ie 9/,
[Certain
Opinions of the General Office of the CT1 Central Committee on Upholding the Party's
Leadership and Strengthening Party Building in Deepening the Reform of State-owned
Enterprises] (these Opinions were known to be issued through press release but have not
been fully made public); see also
')AfffJ
- i
k` j z
M [The General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued
Certain Opinions on Upholding the Party's Leadership and Strengthening Party Building
in Deepening
the Reform of State-owned Enterprises], (Sept. 20, 2015),
http://www.govscn/xinwen/2015-09/20/content_2935593.htm
[https://perma.ec/NW9XNVUP] (archived Feb. 8, 2020) (an unofficial version of the Opinions can be found at
http://xtkg.hnfun.com/uploa/files/2016/6/2916421140.docx
[https://permacc/P56P3XYL] (archived Mar. 19, 2020)).
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may be overlapping appointments in the Party committee and the
board.

D. An Emerging Partnership-BasedCorporateGovernance Model?
The MOR, together with other related reforms launched by the
Chinese Party-state in recent years, has brought certain changes, some
of which are rather fundamental, to the corporate governance
structure in Chinese SOEs. It is argued in this Article that all the
reforms are pushing SOE governance towards a partnership based,
control-sharing model, especially in MOR firms, in which the Party
representatives work together with private investors and share the
authority to govern.
First, MOR has resulted in significant reduction of state

ownership in MOR firms. 185 Although the state still remains the
largest shareholder and is usually in a controlling position, the authors
of this Article observe a clear tendency toward less state-ownership
concentration in MOR enterprises, measured by the transfer of roughly
15 percent to 45 percent of state-owned equity to other investors,

though some of these investors may be state entities. 186

Second, through the reforms, the boundary between the Chinese
government and SOEs has been noticeably drawn and the separation
of power herein is more institutionalized. As discussed previously,
SOEs are evidently acquiring more enterprise autonomy from the
Chinese state because of the negative-list approach. Further, there are
now explicit provisions on the separation of power between the state
and SOEs, which provide that the state shareholders shall exercise
their rights and powers in accordance with the Company Law and

other relevant laws like any other shareholder.

187

This significant

move paves the way for Chinese corporate law, which is still ownership
neutral, to apply more or less equally to SOEs and private firms. As
ownership in a firm is proportionally associated with power and
influence, 18 the shrinking state ownership in the MOR enterprises
has made it possible-and even necessary in many cases-for a
coalition-based governance structure to be established for the state
shareholders and private shareholders to share power.
Third, the participation of the Party committee in SOEs has
certainly been more institutionalized in the sense that the role of the
Party is now clearly required to be provided in the articles of
association.1 89 This is certainly not positive news for those who wish

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Table 3.
id.
supra Part iVA.
supra notes 14, 15, 16 and accompanying text.
supra Part IV.B.
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for complete separation of the Party-state from the SOEs. The flipside
of this change is that clarifying the role of the Party committee in the
articles of association can improve transparency in SOE governance. 19 0
More significantly, the division of labor between the Party committee
and the board of directors has been clarified, which leaves room for the
board to maintain a limited degree of independence in making
personnel decisions, in addition to the business operation decisionmaking powers, which already fall within the purview of the board. 191
Fourth, the MOR practice of several significant
SOEs
demonstrates that shareholder representation on the board of directors
has been improved, and power-sharing among shareholders in the
shareholders' meeting and board of directors has begun to occur. 19 2 The
fact that the state shareholder maintains a less than simple majority
in representation on the board, coupled with a certain degree of
independence reserved for the board in the new setting with more
institutionalized and transparent participation of the Party committee,
makes it not only possible but also inevitable for the controlling state
shareholders to share power in decision making with other
shareholders in SOEs with more diversified ownership structures.

IV. UNDERSTANDING MIXED-OWNERSHIP'S IMPACT ON SOE
GOVERNANCE: THE BENEFIT OF SHARING CONTROL
This Part offers explanations about some of the reasons behind
the MOR drive. It argues that, among other reasons, the MOR is
inspired by the benefits of improved corporate governance and
performance in SOEs through sharing of control between the
controlling state shareholder and large nonstate shareholders (or even
other state shareholders in some cases).
This rationale starts with the conventional wisdom that
ownership matters. As Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart
argued, the value of ownership in a firm lies in the benefits of control
which are not able to be enjoyed by outside investors through

contracts.

193

That is, "contractual incompleteness"

entails that,

190. See Interview: 'Moving Partycommittees in front of the curtain'and Interview:
'Specifying the Party's role will improve transparency',in AWAKENING GOVERNANCE: THE
EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA, supra note 178, at 49-50 (noting the
amendment of articles of association in relation to the role of the CCP "means that the
Party committee moves from behind the scenes to the front of the curtain, increasing
transparency").

191.
192.

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part III (regarding the empirical and case studies).
193. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 691-92
(1986).
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because it is either impossible or "too costly for one party to specify a
long list of the particular rights it desires over another party's
assets," 194 it may be optimal for that party to purchase all the rights
not specified in the contract. In other words, ownership "is the
195
which has positive
purchase of these residual rights of control,"
efficiency consequences as compared to the permanently incomplete
contracts. Thus, ownership always matters because it brings about the
benefit of control, and change in ownership often leads to adjustment
in control rights. This is certainly the case in the Chinese context,
evidenced characteristically by the provisions in the PRC Company
Law, which, in principle, allocate voting power on the basis of equity
19 6
ownership in a firm.

Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi, however,
observe that ownership structure involves a trade-off between control
and managerial initiative, and "a concentrated ownership structure
induces high levels of monitoring and control but renders management
less active." 197 In other words, dominant control of ownership may
reduce incentives and result in inefficiency. Marco Pagano and Ailsa
Roell suggest that, from the viewpoint of an initial owner who takes
into account "his own future private benefits," he would choose to have
the ownership of the firm "sufficiently dispersed to ensure the optimal
degree of monitoring," often through going public. 198 On the other
hand, Armando Gomes and Walter Novaes identified "sharing control,"
which occurs when a single shareholder cannot make unilateral
199
decisions in a company, as a new corporate governance mechanism,

They maintained that, in a firm with multiple controlling
shareholders, the disagreements among those shareholders may

prevent

major

corporate

decisions

from

harming

minority

shareholders, thus improving corporate governance while preserving
2 00
This is because the control is still shared
private benefits of control.
within the control groups which can internalise firm value to a greater
extent than in a situation where shares are sold largely to minority
shareholders. 201 Furthermore, because of the ex post bargaining
problems among controlling shareholders, sharing control "provides a
compromise between the excessive monitoring of an outside investor

Id, at 692, 717.
Id, at 692.
196. See WANG, supra note 2, at 156-60.
197. Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders,
Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q.J. ECON. 693, 694 (1997).
198. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Roell, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:
Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, 113 Q. J. EGON. 187, 215 (1998).
199. See generally Armando Gomes & Walter Novaes, Sharing of Control as a
Corporate Governance Mechanism (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working
Paper No. 09-01, 2000).
200. See id. at 1.
201. See id. at 1-2.
194.
195.
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the private benefits and the excessive

discretion of an unchecked controlling shareholder. " 2 0 2
Overmonitoring problems and undermonitoring problems exist in
Chinese SOEs, though they come from the same controlling
shareholder, the state. Lay-Hong Tan and Jiangyu Wang observed that

there are two types of idiosyncratic problems in China's SOEs

203

The

first one, the undermonitoring problem, stems from the phenomenon
of "strong managers, weak owners" caused by the dominant position of
state shareholding coupled with the absence of state monitoring in
SOEs. 204 As the state was little more than an abstract owner, it had to
act through appointed agents, which in many cases were civil servants
and government officials whose interests were not always aligned with
the state, leading to a situation where "the principal is virtually nonexistent" and a model of insider control which is called "guanjianren
kongzhi (key-person-control)." 2 0 5 In this undermonitoring model, such
a key person, who is usually the SOB's general manager (chief
executive officer or CEO) or the chairperson of the board of directors,
becomes "the super-sovereign and the sole commander of the
company." 206 The key persons would disregard the property rights of
the company as well as that of both the state and nonstate

shareholders

in the SOE. 207 The rampant corruption in SOEs

demonstrated that, in many firms, SOE key persons were out of
control, even from the hands of the state, and represented only their
personal interests rather than being a loyal agent to the state. 208 As
Chen Gang pointed out, Chinese President Xi Jinping's anticorruption

drive against SOE officials in the 2013-2014 period, in the form of the
inspection of fourteen major SOEs by the CCP's Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection, led to the fall of over seventy SOE executives.
These executives were found to be involved in "accepting bribes in
procurement, buying and selling of official positions, wining and dining
at public expense and assisting relatives in starting business with
returns." 2 0 9 The behaviour of these key persons certainly harmed the
interests of the minority shareholders, but they also undermined the
interests of the controlling state shareholder 2 i 0 In short, the dominant

202. Id. at 2.
203. See generally Lay-Hong Tan & Jiangyu Wang, Modelling an Effective
Corporate Governance System for China's Listed State-owned Enterprises:Issues and
Challenges in a TransitionalEconomy, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 143 (2007).
204. See id. at 149.
205. Id. at 149-50.
206. Id. at 150.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 150.
209. CHEN GANG, CHINA'S GRAFT BUSTERS TARGET STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:
EAI BAcKGROUND BRIEF No. 1058, 1-2 (2015).
210. This is because the key persons put their own interest above the interest of
all shareholders, including the state.
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but abstract position of state ownership in SOEs caused, in many
cases, an undermonitoring problem which left the companies in the
private hands of a few individuals.
There are also problems resulting from overmonitoring and
excessive intervention from the state shareholder at the expense of the
SOEs and its minority shareholders. Tan and Wang observed that
"[m]any SOEs are debt-ridden enterprises 'repackaged' for listing and
continue to be controlled by their parent companies who, having

successfully seen to their IPO, look towards them as cash cows for
ready milking." 2 11 Tunneling by controlling shareholders is pervasive
21
Further, the
in both SOEs and privately owned companies (POEs).
overmonitoring problems caused by the parent also bred weak
managerial incentives in some instances because the appointments to
213
managerial positions in SOEs were politically determined.
The MOR, which is essentially partial privatization, thus offers a
practical solution to the undermonitoring and overmonitoring

problems in Chinese SOEs-by establishing a partnership-based,
sharing of control governance model. Through the MOR, nonstate
social/private capital is introduced into the SOEs to effect ownership
change and diversified board composition by giving nonstate
shareholders a larger representation on the board. This change is tied
in with other institutional changes, which further strengthen control
sharing as described above, including shifting the regulatory
philosophy of the state shareholder from asset management to capital
management and the release of powers from SASAC to SOEs.
Findings in the empirical and econometric literature on corporate
governance in China consistently support the idea that Chinese SOEs
with a certain degree of mixed ownership produced the most optimal
performance results in the current political setting, which arguably
strengthened the Chinese Party-state's political will to promote the
MOR.2 14 An earlier study by Qian Sun, Wilson H. S. Tong, and Jing
Tong surveyed the firm performance of all companies listed on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SSE) and found a positive correlation between government ownership

and firm performance.

215

In other words, "partial government

211 Tan & Wang, supra note 203, at 150-51 (noting a listed SOE, Luoyang
Chundu, had to go bankrupt because its parent company borrowed and did not repay
RMB 330 million after its IPO in 1998).
212. See Guoping Li, The Pervasiveness and Severity of Tunneling by Controlling
Shareholders in China, 21 CHINA ECON. REV. 310, 311 (2010) (noting "tunneling by
controlling shareholders is widespread and severe"').
213. See Cyril Lin, Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China's
Economic Transition, 34 EcON. PLAN. 5, 7-8 (2001).
214. See infra notes 214-221 and accompanying text.
215. See Qian Sun, Wilson H. S. Tong & Jing 'l'ong, How Does Government
OwnershipAffect Firm Performance?Evidence from China'sPrivatizationExperience, 29
J. Bus. FIN. & AccT. 1 3 (2002).
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ownership has a positive impact on SOE performance."2 16 The authors,
however, discovered that the relationship was nonlinear and followed
"an inverted U-shape" pattern. 217 To wit, "100% government
ownership is not good, but no government ownership is not good either.
21 8
The optimal government ownership may be somewhere in between,
though the authors did not address what was the "optimal" percentage
of state ownership. In any event, as Gary H. Jefferson and Jian Su

suggested,

the conversion

of SOEs to shareholding

companies

incorporated under the Company Law "contributes to overall increases

in both current productivity and innovative effort." 2 19
More recently, Guy S. Liu, John Beirne, and Pei Sun observed that
"partial privatization, which leads to mixed ownership, can be an
optimal form of privatization in the context of China's political system
which is characterized by state capitalism" in investigating the
performance of 1,184 firms in China, which underwent ownership
transformation over the period of 1997 to 2003. 220 The authors
concluded that ownership restructuring, particularly that which
brought private investment to state firms, was the most appropriate
approach to reforming SOEs and also enabled firms to gain favourable
synergy gains from both the government and private sector.2 2 1
Apart from benefiting from sharing control, it is increasingly clear
that the MOR also functions as industrial policy for the Chinese state
to make use of private resources-which include not merely capitalto help SOEs grow stronger. The more important resources are the
technologies, talents, and market networks owned by the potential
private strategic investors. In the case of China Unicom's MOR, the
intention was announced at the planning stage of the MOR that China
Unicom would choose to sell stakes to potential shareholders, which
were referred to by China Unicom as "cooperation partners" (hezuo
huoban), on the condition that they could complement China Unicorn's
business, especially in the Internet industry. 222 Soon after, China
Unicom announced strategic cooperation plans with Alibaba and
Tencent, China's e-commerce giants which were also the leading

216. Id. at 22.
217. Id, at 19.
218. Id.
219. Gary H. Jefferson & Jian Su, Privatization and Restructuring in China:
Evidence from Shareholding Ownership, 1995-2001, 34 J. COMP. EcoN. 146 146 (2006).
220. Guy S. Liu, John Beirne & Pei Sun, The Performance Impact of Firm
Ownership Transformation in China: Mixed Ownership vs. Fully Privatised Ownership,
13 J. CHINA ECoN. Bus. STUD. 197, 198 (2015).
221. See id. at 212.
222. See jWAX&
4VN
KN1 911'J
[China Unicom's MOR Would Target
Cooperation Partners which Strongly Complement its Business], CHINA SEC. DAILY (Nov
5, 2016), http://finance.ifeng;com/a/20161105/14986787_O.shtml [https://perma.cc/2TBBVAZG] (archived Feb. 11, 2020).
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23
private investors in the Chinese Unicom MOR programme 2 The
agreement with Tencent was presented as the "first major business
cooperation with strategic investors after China Unicom's [MOR]
proposal was approved," in which the two shareholders of post-MOR
CUNC committed to cooperate and share resources to build a new
22 4
internet-industry ecosystem platform.

V.

CONCLUSION

There is a body of literature that has found that in general the
profitability and efficiency of resource allocation in SOEs are lower
than in private firms. 225 This recognition has led to attempts by
various countries from time to time to reform their SOEs, and China is
only one example. However, the reform of SOEs is not without its
challenges. For example, A. Musacchio, E.I.P. Ayerbe, and G. Garcia
explored the challenges that certain Latin American countries faced
22 6
In particular the authors
when attempting to reform their SOEs.
pointed to the corporate governance problem and the fiscal governance
problem. 227 To overcome these problems, they advocated that
governments should design governance mechanisms that rely on the
228
market, on ex ante administrative controls, or on hybrid solutions.
The mechanisms should be designed on a case by case basis that suit

&

-

223. See China Unicorn Announces Cooperation with Tencent and Alibaba
Following Mixed-Ownership Reform. TELECOM REVIEW ASIA (Oct. 24 2017),
https://www.telecomreviewasia.com/index.php/news/industry - news/814-china-unicorn
announces-cooperation-with-tencent-and-alibaha-following-mixed-ownership-reform
[https://perma ec/5D6Z-B5PV] (archived Feb. 11, 2020).
224. Press Release, China Unicom Ltd., China Unicom's Mixed-Ownership Reform
Leaps Forward in Business Cooperation with Tencent (Oct. 23, 2017) (on file with
author).
225. See generally Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and
Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private,
Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1989); Kathryn L. DeWenter
Paul H. ialatesta, State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms:An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 320 (2001); Yuan Ding,
Hua Zhang & Junxi Zhang, Private us. State Ownership and Earnings Management:
Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, 15 CoRP. Gov. 223 (2007); Eski Goldeng, Leo
A., Grunfeld & Gabriel R. G. Benito, The Performance Differential between Private and
State Owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership, Management, and Marhet Structure,
45 J. MGMT. STUD. 1244 (2008); David A. Ralston, et al., Today's State-Owned
Enterprises of China: Are They Dying Dinosaursor Dynamic Dynamos? 27 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 825 (2006); Andrei Shleifer, State versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON.
PEEsP. 133 (1998); Aidan R. Vining & Anthony E. Boardman, Ownership versus
Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprises, 73 PUB. CHOICE 205 (1992).
226. See generally Aldo Musacchio, et al., State-Owned EnterpriseReform in Latin
America: Issues and Possible Solutions (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Discussion Paper
No. IDB-DP-401, 2015).
227. See id. at 3-4, 9-16.
228. See id. at 17-41.
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the circumstances.2 2 9 Similarly, Stefano Clo, et al. found from their
study of the reforms in ten major Italian SOEs from 2004 to 2013 that
listed SOEs that operated in liberalized markets gained higher profits

and dividends, while unlisted SOEs operating in noncompetitive
markets that are compelled to maintain an informal public mission

often incur economic losses. 2 3 0
Similarly, the MOR programme is the Chinese government's
attempt to further expose its SOEs to market forces, while at the same
time subject governance to greater scrutiny and supervision. In the

absence of large institutional investors across China's capital market,
the strategic investors can play such a role. Indeed, the scale of this
type of investment in the SOEs, coupled with the strategic investors'
accountability to their own shareholders, provides the investors with
the incentive to monitor management. Arguably, their ability to do so
is enhanced by the board seats that many of the strategic investors
hold, unlike many institutional investors. As Table 3 shows, of thirtythree SOEs surveyed, sixteen have outside directors that constitute a
majority of the board.2 3 1 It must also be recognized that many if not all
the strategic investors have strong links to the Party-state itself. This
is true not only for the state-owned strategic investors but also the
large private ones as well, given that links with the Party-state have
hitherto been important for commercial success. It will, therefore, be
much more difficult today for powerful managers to abuse their

positions for personal gain.
At the same time, the clearer mandate within the corporate
constitution of the party committee potentially acts as another check
on management abuse as one of the key roles of the committee is to
ensure discipline on the part of Communist Party members, which is
still an essential requirement for advancement to the higher levels of
management. Through its control of personnel appointments and
responsibility for discipline, it is in a position to remove senior
managers who abuse their positions. This aspect of the MOR
programme can be seen as a logical extension of President Xi Jinping's
drive to root out corruption within the Party-state.
While the desire for SOE reform appears strong, it remains to be

seen

how

such

reform

tendencies

can

be

sustained

and

institutionalised as opposed to being the personal initiative of the
current, strong leader. In countries with a competitive democratic
system, the need to establish legitimacy at each election cycle can act
as a constraint on the ruling party of the day. This certainly was the
Singapore experience in the 1950s and 1960s when a weak People's

229. See id. at 1.
230. See Stefano C16, et al., Italian State-Owned Enterprises After Decades of
Reforms: Still Public? 4 (CIRIEC, Working Paper No. 19, 2015).
231. See supra Table 3.
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management, including the management of Singapore's SOEs, to
deliver tangible benefits to the public and thereby cemented its support
over time. This narrative on the part of the PAP, coupled with the need

to win a mandate every four to five years, continues to act as a
constraint on the PAP.232 It is not clear that the Chinese Party-state,
which is itself above the law, faces sufficient institutional constraints
to ensure a deep rooted commitment to good governance in SOEs.

232, See Tan Cheng Han, The Beijing Consensus and Possible Lessons from the
"SingaporeModel"? 15-17 (Natl Univ. of Sing, Working Paper No. 001, 2016); 'Fan et
al., supra note 60, at 85.

